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Positivism and the
Notion of an Offense
ClaireFinkelsteint
Yet law-abidingscholarswrite
Law is neitherwrong nor right.-W.H. Auden
While the United States Supreme Court has developed an elaborate
constitutionaljurisprudence of criminal procedure, it has articulatedfew
constitutional doctrines of the substantive criminal law. The asymmetry
between substance and procedure seems natural given the demise of
Lochner and the minimaliststance towardsdue process outside the area of
fundamental rights. This Article, however, argues that the "positivistic"
approach to defining criminal offenses stands in some tension with other
basic principles, both constitutional and moral. In particular, two important constitutionalguarantees depend on the notion of an offense: the presumption of innocence and the ban on double jeopardy. Under the
positivistic orthodoxy, the scope of these doctrines is left to state legislatures to determine. The presumption of innocence and the ban on double
jeopardy thus suggest the needfor a substantiveconceptionof the notion of
'an offense. This Article attempts to provide a jurisprudentialframework
for developing such a conception. It proceeds from the idea that we have a
presumption against the use of the criminal sanction, stemmingfrom the
commitmentto a background right to liberty our constitutionaljurisprudence contains. The use of the criminal sanction is justified only if the
infringementof liberty it imposes is sufficient to overcome that presumption. This requirementof justification in turn suggests boundaries on the
notion of an offense: The definition of an offense must be constructedin a
way that makes the infringementof libertyjustified in light of the harm the
prohibited conduct inflicts.
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INTRODUCTION

Among the variousquestionsto which criminallaw theoristscould
devotetheirattention,one mightexpect "Whatis a crime?"to rankfirst
and foremost. Surprisinglylittle effort, however, has been expended
answeringit. Moreover,thereis little consensuseven amongthose who
have studiedthe matterclosely. Somethinkof a crimeas an immoralact,
takingthe view thatall andonly immoralacts oughtto be punished.Others adopta morerelativisticposition,claimingthata crimeis a community's emphaticdenunciationof a type of conduct, and that the only
is social. Stillothersofferan economic
legitimatebasisfor criminalization
rationale,maintainingthata crimeis a coercivetransferof resourcesfrom
whichis inefficientbecauseit bypassesan available
victimto perpetrator,
market.3
voluntary
Ironically,one answeracademicsdo not normallyadvanceis the
answerthe Americanlegal system has most consistentlyendorsed:A
crime is whatever a legislature passes into law under the heading
"criminal."
Ourlegal system,in short,takesa predominantly
positivistic
is
no
that
there
of
to
the
notion
crime,
meaning
particularstrucapproach
ture or contentthat legislationdenominated"criminal"must have. As
HenryHartwrotea numberof yearsago, "If one wereto judge fromthe
notions apparentlyunderlyingmany judicial opinions, and the overt
languageeven of some of them... a crimeis anythingwhichis called a
crime, and a criminalpenaltyis simply the penaltyprovidedfor doing
anythingwhichhas been given thatname."4This suggestsa gap between
academicintuitionsandjudicialbehavioraboutthe natureof crime.Academicssearchfor criteriato determinewhichactivitiesareproperobjects
basedon theiradherenceto normsthattheybelieveoughtto
of prohibition,
of the criminalsanction.Judicialoversightof criminalstatthe
use
govern
utes, by contrast,proceeds as if no such norms were available. One
explanationfor this gap might be that academicswho have offered a
generalaccountof crimehavenot for the mostpartattemptedto translate
theirtheoriesinto concreteproposalsfor definingoffenses. A theoryof
crimewill remainjudiciallyidle unlessit can also providea way of idention thekindsof criminalstatuteslegislaturesmaydraft.
fyingconstraints

See MICHAELMOORE,PLACINGBLAME 637-67 (1997). H.L.A. Hart coined the expression
1.
"legal moralism" to refer to this position. H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY,AND MORALITY6 (1963); see

also infra PartIII (discussingMoore on legal moralism).
2.

See H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 6-8 (1967).

3. See Richard Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1193
(1985) (presenting a theory of crime in terms of an intentional bypass of an available voluntary
market).
PROBS.401, 404
4. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 L. & CONTEMP.
(1958) (citationsomitted).
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The suggestionthatthe Courttakesa positivisticstancetowardsthe
notionof an offenserequiresexplanation.Historically,legalpositivismhas
been contrastedwithnaturallaw theories.In this sense,nearlyall contemporarylegal doctrinesarepositivistic,in thatthey are self-avowedlyconWe mightalso say,however,thata legaldoctrineor
ventional,notnatural.5
is
concept "positivistic"if it derivesits contententirelyfrom legislative
It is substantive,or nonpositivistic,
if it derivesits content
pronouncement.
at least in partfromdeeperand morefundamental
principles.Wherethe
notionof an offenseis concerned,the nonpositivisticalternativeis to treat
the substantiveprovisionsof the criminallaw as restingon a set of constitutionalvalues.The SupremeCourt'sapproachto the notionof an offense
is positivistic in this sense, then, because the Court has been
thebasicdoctrinesof thecriminallaw.
unwillingto constitutionalize
The Court'scommitmentto positivismhas manifesteditself most
obviouslyin its approachto strictliabilitycrimes,whereit has gone to
some lengthsto avoidhavingto pronouncethe inclusionof a mentalstate
in offensedefinitionsa matterof constitutional
mandate.6
The
requirement
closestthe Courthas cometo constitutionalizing
mensreawas its declaration thattraditionalcommonlaw crimesshouldbe construedas requiring
scienterwherethe legislatureis silentas to intent.Thisprinciple,however,
is a rule of construction,not a constitutionalrequirement.7
The Canadian
has
been
less
It
restrained. has found strict
SupremeCourt,by contrast,
liability crimes "not in accordancewith the precepts of fundamental
The
justice"guaranteed
by the CanadianCharterof RightsandFreedoms.8
stance
towards
offense
definition
has
also
positivistic
appearedin the
Court'sapproachto the defensesof the criminallaw. It is apparentlya
matterof constitutionalindifferencewhethera statechooses to grantits
citizens defenses such as provocation,9self-defense,10intoxication,1
5. Even Ronald Dworkin, who argues that principles of our moral and political philosophy
should inform the interpretationof both constitutional and statutoryprovisions, does not attempt to
claim that these backgroundprinciples are drawn from the naturalorder of the universe. He suggests
instead that they are deep-seatedcommitmentsof our social practices,but that they neverthelessshould
occupy the kind of foundationalposition that precepts of naturallaw might once have occupied. See
RONALDDWORKIN,
LAW'SEMPIRE,
78-85, 266-71 (1986). The only prominent contemporarylegal
theorist who endorses natural law theory wholeheartedly is John Finnis. See, e.g., JOHNFINNIS,
NATURAL
LAWANDNATURAL
RIGHTS
(1980).
6. See United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943) (holding president of company
criminally liable for drug shipment of which he was entirely ignorant);United States v. Balint, 258
U.S. 250, 252 (1922) (accepting strict liability statute designed for "social betterment"rather than
punishment);see also Alan C. Michaels, ConstitutionalInnocence 112 HARV.L. REV.828, 832 (1999)
and sources cited therein.
7. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952) (establishing a rule that common law
crimes contain a mens rea requirementif legislaturesilent on mental state).
8. CAN.CONST.(ConstitutionAct, 1982) pt. I (CanadianCharterof Rights and Freedoms), cl.
11, ?7.
9. See Pattersonv. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977) (upholdingNew York law shifting burden
to prove provocationto defendant).
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mistakeof law,12or even insanity."3
Similarly,the Constitution
supposedly
has little to say aboutthe use of legal presumptions,14
despitethe serious
constitutional
difficultiesthey appearto raisewhenused to provethe elementsof a criminaloffense.15
TheCourt'scommitmentto positivismaboutoffensedefinition,however,has not beenmonolithic.Oneexceptionis the line of casesestablishing restrictionson the way criminal offenses are drafted, stemming
principallyfrom the due processrequirementthatcitizens be placedon
notice of theirpotentialsubjectionto criminalsanctions.16
Statuteshave
been routinelystruckdown for failingto identifythe prohibitedconduct
with precision, or for casting the net of criminalizationtoo broadly,
thus subjectingindividualsto criminalpunishmentfor engagingin ordinary,protectedactivities.17Anotheris the line of cases representedby
in whichthe CourtstruckdownlegislationcrimiRobinsonv. California,'8
nalizinga defendant'scondition.Thereareeven isolatedcases, Lambertv.
10. See Martin v. Ohio, 480 U.S. 228 (1987) (upholding Ohio's burden-shiftingprovision with
respectto self-defense on groundsthat state has no obligationto providedefense of self-defense).
11. See Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37 (1996) (upholding state law renderingevidence of
voluntaryintoxicationinadmissible).
12. See United States v. InternationalMinerals& ChemicalCorp.,402 U.S. 558, 563 (1971). The
Court has nevertheless eroded this principle around the edges by declaring a rule of statutory
construction in favor of such a defense. See Liparota v. United States, 471 U.S. 419 (1985)
(interpretingmens rea requirementswith regardto mistakeof law).
13. See Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952) (upholdingstate law shifting burdenof proof on
insanitydefense).
14. See Ferryv. Ramsey, 277 U.S. 88 (1928) (holding use of presumptionsa matterof legislative
discretion).
15. The Courthas however found the use of mandatorypresumptionsunconstitutional.See Ulster
County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 157 (1979) (finding mandatory presumptions troublesome
because they affect both the strengthand placement of the "no reasonabledoubt"burden);Sandstrom
v. Montana,442 U.S. 510, 521-523 (1979) (rejectingmandatorypresumptionson the groundsthatthey
establish a conclusive inference). See generally Harold A. Ashford & D. Michael Risinger,
Presumptions,Assumptions,and Due Process in Criminal Cases: A Theoretical Overview, 79 YALE
L.J. 165, 178 (1969) (arguing that burden of persuasion operating under permissible inference is no
differentfrom any otherburdenof persuasion).
16. See Papachristouv. City of Jacksonville,405 U.S. 156 (1972) (finding Jacksonvillevagrancy
ordinancevoid for vagueness on groundsthatit fails to give persons of ordinaryintelligence fair notice
thatcontemplatedconduct is forbiddenand because it encouragesarbitraryarrestsand convictions).
17. The so-called "overbreadth"cases have mainly concerned First Amendment rights. See
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (strikingdown ordinanceprohibitingcross burningas
overbroad);Texas v. Johnson,491 U.S. 397 (1989) (strikingdown law makingit illegal to deface flag);
Massachusetts v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576, 584 (1989) ("Overbreadthis a judicially created doctrine
designed to prevent chilling of protectedexpression.");Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130
(1974) (striking down statute on grounds that it is susceptible of application to speech protected by
First Amendment); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972) (upholding decision of Fifth Circuit
striking down statute criminalizing using "'opprobriouswords or abusive language"' as vague and
overbroad).
18. 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (striking down statutecriminalizing status of being an addict). But see
Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968) (holding that punishmentfor public drunkennessis no violation
of due process).
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California'9 providing the best example, in which the Court has
invalidated criminal legislation because of its discomfort with the use of
strictliability, despite the official stance that criminalizationin the absence
of mens rea is constitutionallyacceptable.
The largest area of substantivereview, however, is the line of cases
reviving the doctrine of substantive due process. The most significant of
these are the cases vindicating a constitutionalright to privacy. Here the
Court has been unabashedin engaging in substantivereview of criminal
legislation to protect a nonenumeratedright. Under this heading, the Court
has refused to allow states to prohibitthe use of birthcontrol between married persons,20the use of pornographic material in the privacy of one's
home,21the right of women to choose to terminate an unwanted pregnancy,22the right of minors to seek an abortion without parentalnotice,23
and even the right of homosexuals to challenge legislation discriminating
againstthem.24
This is not to deny the Court's persistent unease with its own intermittent willingness to police the boundaries of the substantive criminal
law. As CharlesNesson has written,"eachtime the Courthas venturedinto
substantive limitation theory it has quickly retreated."25Thus Robinson26

19. 355 U.S. 225 (1957) (finding ordinancerequiringconvicted felons to register with the police
in Los Angeles within five days of arrivalunconstitutional).
20. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (striking down Connecticut statute
illegalizing use of birthcontrol).
21. See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (striking down Georgia statute making
privatepossession of obscene mattera crime).
22. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that the right to privacy includes a woman's
decision whetheror not to terminatea pregnancy).
23. See Guste v. Jackson, 429 U.S. 399 (1977) (vacating an injunctionagainst enforcementof a
Louisiana statute forbidding the performance of an abortion on a minor without her parents' or
husband'sconsent).
24. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (striking down Amendment 2 of Colorado State
Constitution on grounds that it denies gays and lesbians equal protection of the law). Granted, the
official doctrine insists that the only reason there is federal judicial power to review criminalization
decisions in this area for more than their rationalityis that privacy is a recognized fundamentalright.
Like free speech, infringements on the right to privacy must be justified by a "compelling state
interest."But this rationalehas seemed to many somewhat disingenuous,for at least two reasons. First,
the only real supportfor the idea of a fundamentalconstitutional right to privacy are the very cases
striking down privacy-infringinglegislation. See supra notes 20-22 and sources cited therein. Second,
arguablythe more naturalway to understandthe interestsat stake in such cases is that they are aspects
of a rightto liberty. But since the demise of Lochner, official doctrinehas rejectedthe idea that the Due
Process Clause contains a generalnotion of libertywith independentconstitutionalmeaning,apartfrom
the guaranteesof the Bill of Rights and those "liberty"interests a state chooses to grant its citizens.
Lochnerv. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
25. Charles R. Nesson, Rationality, Presumptions, and Judicial Comment: A Response to
Professor Allen, 94 HARV.L. REV.1574, 1581 (1981) (citations omitted) (critiquing Ronald Allen's
theory of burden-shiftingdevices).
26. 370 U.S. at 660 (holding required 90-day imprisonmentbased on the "status"of narcotic
addict inflicted "crueland unusualpunishment"in violation of the EighthAmendment).
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was followed by Powell,27 Furman28by Gregg,29and Mullaney3 by

and
Patterson.31
The samedynamicappearsto be at workbetweenSolem32
Harmelin,33Grady34and Dixon,35and even perhaps Lambert36and later
decisionslike Park.37But insteadof concluding,as Nesson does, thatthe

Courtis permanentlyset againstsubstantivelimitationtheory,one might
see thehistoryas attestingto a pullin the oppositedirection.Ourconstitutionaltraditiondisplaysbothtendencies,andwhile the rejectionof a constitutionalized
criminallaw enjoysstrongsupportfromthe officialdemise
of substantivedue process,thereare conflictingthreadsin our constituthatmeritconsideration.
tionaljurisprudence
of the officialrejectionof subThisArticleproposesa reexamination
stantivelimitationtheory.Othershaverecentlyissuedthe samepleaon the
rules
groundsthatthe sharpdistinctionbetweensubstantiveandprocedural
Stillothersarguethat
withregardtojudicialoversightcannotbejustified.38
to punisha personwho is not blameworthy,
it shouldbe unconstitutional
and they accordinglyproposethat mens rea shouldbe a constitutional
requirementof all criminaloffenses.39The argumentfor constitutionalizing

27. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968) (holding conviction for public drunkennessof one
compelled to drinkis not cruel and unusualpunishment).
28. Furmanv. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (invalidatingGeorgia death penalty law as arbitrary
and capricious).
29. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (upholding revised death penalty statute based on
scheme of guided discretion).
30. Mullaney v. Wilbur,421 U.S. 684 (1975) (holding Maine law placing burdenon defendantto
prove heat of passion or suddenprovocationviolates due process).
31. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977) (placing burden on defendant to prove
affirmativedefense of extremeemotionaldistressdoes not violate due process).
32. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983) (holding sentence of life imprisonment with no
possibility of parolefor nonviolentoffense prohibitedby the EighthAmendment).
33. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (holding mandatory life sentence with no
possibility of parole for possession of more than 650 grams of cocaine is not cruel and unusual
punishment).
34. Gradyv. Corbin,495 U.S. 508 (1990) (holding double jeopardy bars subsequentprosecution
where prosecution must rely on proof of conduct that constituted an offense for which the defendant
was alreadyprosecuted).
35. United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688 (1993) (holding ban on double jeopardy does not
requirethat subsequentprosecutionssatisfy a "sameconducttest").
36. 355 U.S. at 225.
37. United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658 (1978) (affirming, in general, validity of strict liability
laws).
38. See William J. Stuntz, Substance, Process, and the Civil Criminal Line, 7 J. CONTEMP.
ISSUES1 (1996) (discussingrelationbetween criminalprocedureand substantivecriminallaw).
LEGAL
39. See, e.g., Larry Alexander, The Supreme Court, Dr. Jekyll, and the Due Process of Proof,
1996 SuP. CT. REV.191; Gary V. Dubin, Mens Rea Reconsidered: A Plea for a Due Process Concept
of CriminalResponsibility, 18 STAN.L. REV.322, 392-95 (1966); C. Peter Erlinder,MensRea, Due
Process, and the Supreme Court: Towarda ConstitutionalDoctrine of SubstantiveCriminalLaw, 9
AM. J. CRIM.L. 163, 165-66 (1981); Hart, supra note 4, at 422-25; James J. Hippard, Sr., The
Unconstitutionalityof CriminalLiability WithoutFault: An Argumentfor a ConstitutionalDoctrine of
Mens Rea, 10 Hous. L. REV.1039, 1039-40 (1973); John C. Jeffries & Paul B. StephanIII, Defenses,
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the notionof an offensepresentedhere,however,will not be basedon the
disparitybetweensubstanceandprocedure.Norwill it be basedon the idea
that only culpableagents shouldbe punished.Instead,this Articlewill
arguefor the needfor a substantivetheoryof offensedefinitionby consideringtwo importantconstitutionalguarantees:the presumptionof innocence andthe banon doublejeopardy.Underthe positivisticapproachto
offense definition,bothdoctrineshave becomeentirelysubjectto legislative discretion.Somethingpeculiaris at work,however,whentheextentof
a constitutionalguaranteethat ought to limit the reach of the criminal
sanctionis determinedby the legislationestablishingthe sanctionitself.
While thereare constitutionaltheoriesthat would considerthe statutory
indebtednessof these doctrinesa virtue,40
the morewidely sharedunderof
constitutional
is
that
standing
rights
they provideprotectionfor individualsagainsttheirgovernment
ratherthana constitutional
for
imprimatur
legislativejudgment.41
The kind of substantivelimitationfor which this Articlewill argue
appliesto the requiredcriminalconductinsteadof the mentalstate-the
actusreusratherthanthe mensrea.ThisArticlesuggeststhatconstitutionalizingthe conductinsteadof the mentalstaterequirement-the"special,"
ratherthanthe "general"part-will providea morecompellingsourceof
limitationon offensedefinition.42
Mentalstaterequirements
do not restrict
whata legislaturecan criminalize.For this reason,they do not by themselves significantlyenhancethe freedomof individualsfrom unwanted
intrusion.If thereis a constitutional
governmental
presumption
againstthe
use of the criminalsanction,then,it cannotbe overcomeby showingthat
the defendantengagedin the prohibitedconductwith a certainmental
state.
The presumptionof innocence and the ban on double jeopardy
stronglysuggesttheneedfor somesubstantive
theoryof offensedefinition.
A morerobusttheoryof these constitutionalguarantees,however,would
emergefromany numberof nonpositivisticaccountsof the notionof an
offense.The latterhalf of this Articlewill attemptto providethe outlines
of one such theory,basedon the fact thatcriminallegislationis libertyinfringing.The claimis thatthe morea statuteinfringesthe basicrightto
liberty,the strongerthe presumptionagainstit, andhencethe greaterthe
justificationrequiredto vindicateits use. This Articlewill arguethatthe
Presumptions,and Burden of Proof in the CriminalLaw, 88 YALE L.J. 1325 (1979); Michaels, supra
note 6; HerbertL. Packer,Mens Rea and the SupremeCourt, 1962 SUP.CT.REV.107, 107-10.
40. See infra PartIII (discussing the "positivist"theoryof due process).
41.

See DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 383

(1993) (presenting origin of constitutionalrights as belief in naturalentitlements enforceable against
legislatures).
42.

See LEO KATZ, BAD ACTS AND GUILTY MINDS 2 (1987) (explaining distinction between

general and special partsof criminallaw).
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correct substantive account of the notion of an offense is provided by
determining when the use of the criminal sanction overcomes this presumption. While all legislation is liberty-infringing in at least a weak
sense, the degree of infringement is usually sufficiently minor that the
interference can be easily justified by considerations of instrumental
rationality,in conjunctionwith a permissive test for the legitimacy of legislative aims. This Article suggests, however, that since criminallegislation
is highly invasive of liberty, the mere demonstration of a measure's
instrumentalrationalityought not to be thought sufficient to overcome the
presumptionagainstit.
Parts I and II explain the difficulties with the positivistic understandof
ing the notion of an offense as used in the presumptionof innocence and
the ban on double jeopardy, respectively. These doctrines observe some
striking similarities, for the positivistic understandingof an offense at the
heartof both has engenderedboth similarpatternsof reasoningand similar
difficulties in the two areas. In particular,we see a certainproposalamong
commentatorsfor avoiding the collapse of these guaranteesinto statutory
concepts but that would allow courts to remain faithful to the positivistic
orthodoxy about the notion of an offense. Parts I and II argue that these
intermediate accounts fail where both doctrines are concerned, and that
they fail for the same reason. Both Parts conclude that the constitutional
doctrine in question cannot be meaningful as a source of protectionunless
independentconstitutionalcontentcan be given to the notion of an offense.
Part III considers the various cases in which the Courthas developed
either implicit or explicit substantive limitations on offense definition.
Drawing on certain common themes that appearin these ratherdisparate
areas of law, this Partproposes a jurisprudentialframeworkfor developing
a nonpositivistic understandingof the notion of an offense. In particular,
this framework should make it possible to develop a more stringent
account than courts traditionallyrequireof when legislation involving significant infringementsof liberty is justified. It might allow us to say, for
example, that a liberty-infringingmeasureis not justified if there is a substantially less invasive measure the legislature could have adopted to
accomplishthe same end.
Part IV begins by considering a theory that would justify use of the
criminal sanction to prevent or punish immoral acts, a theory sometimes
referred to as "legal moralism."43While legal moralism improves on the
currentpositivistic orthodoxy, it remains open to a number of important
objections. This Part then explores an alternativebased on a different theory of justification, namely the idea that the function of the criminallaw is
the protection of the community from those activities that inflict harm on
others. The "harmprinciple,"as it is often called after John StuartMill's
43.

See HART,supra note 1, at 6; see also MOORE, supra note 1, at 69-70.
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rivals legal moralism
famous argumentfor the legitimacy of government,44
as a basis for developing an appropriatetheory of justification for the use
of the criminal sanction. From this theory of justified punishment,it may
be possible to derive the proposed constitutionalconstraintson the notion
of an offense. Finally, Part V returnsto the two constitutionalguarantees
that first led us to question the positivistic approachto offense definition.It
attempts to sketch-inevitably in extremely limited detail-how the proposed limits on the use of the criminal sanction might be used to revise
each of these constitutionaldoctrines.
This Article will necessarily paint with very broad strokes, and
no doubt it will fail to do justice to a numberof doctrinalquestions, burdens of proof and double jeopardy in particular. But understandingthe
relation these doctrines bear towards the notion of an offense should help
to raise doubts about the Court's increasingly positivistic orientation.The
full developmentof an alternativetheory of offense definition, however, is
beyond the scope of this Article.
I
POSITIVISMABOUT THE PRESUMPTIONOF INNOCENCE

The presumptionof innocence was constitutionalizedwith the case of
In Re Winship,45 which held that the Due Process Clause requires proof
beyond a reasonabledoubt "'of every fact necessary to constitutethe crime
The Courtcreatedno end of difficulties, however, by failing to
charged."'46
specify how to identify such a fact. The naturalinterpretationis that the
phrase refers to the elements of an offense. But how to decide what constitutes an element of an offense? If the concept is interpretedbroadly,
anything bearing on a defendant's liability to punishmentcould be part of
the offense definition, in which case the constitutionalprotection Winship
affords would be extensive. If understood narrowly, however, the prosecutorial burden could be reduced to the most minimal facts, leaving the
state free to shift the burden with respect to any number of issues that
might bear on the defendant's risk of punishment. It is puzzling that the
Winship Court did not attend to this difficulty, for the rule that the
prosecution must prove every element of an offense manifestly has no
determinatecontent of its own. Its meaning must derive from the underlying concept of an offense one adopts.
The now orthodox solution to this problem arrivedwith Patterson v.
New York.47That case involved a New York homicide statutethat reduced
44. JOHNSTUART
MILL, ON LIBERTY
(NortonCriticalEdition, 1975) 10-11 (presentingprinciple
that establishesthe avoidanceof harmas the only legitimategroundsfor exertingpower over others).
45. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
46. Id. at 363.
47. 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
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if the defendantcouldproveby a
the chargefrommurderto manslaughter
killed underthe influenceof
the
that
he
had
of
evidence
preponderance
The PattersonCourtupheldthe burdenextremeemotionaldisturbance.48
shiftingprovision,interpretingWinship'sguaranteeas applyingonly to
thosefactsthe legislaturehadchosen to treatas elementsof the offense.49
Since the Due ProcessClausedoes not tell a statehow to draftits murder
andmanslaughter
provisions,the Courtreasoned,the legislatureis under
no obligationto providea given defense.Andif the legislaturecan refuse
to granta defense,thensurelyit canchooseto provideit butplacetheburden on the defendantto proveit.50The Pattersonpositionon burdensof
of the notion
proofthusfollowsdirectlyfromits positivisticunderstanding
of an offense: If an offenseis whateverthe legislaturechoosesto prohibit,
and an elementis simply one of the componentsthe legislatureuses to
define the offense, it follows that the legislaturehas plenarypower to
determinethe parametersof the requirementthat the prosecutionprove
everyelementof anoffensebeyonda reasonabledoubt.
for Patterson
Thedecisioncameas a bit of a shockto commentators,
evisceratedWinship,given that it effectivelyeliminatedany restrictions
LegisWinshiphadplacedon the criminalstatuteslegislaturescan draft.51
of innocencewithrespectto a
laturescouldnow obviatethe presumption
given elementsimplyby excludingit fromthe definitionof the offense,
andeitherconvertingit to an affirmativedefenseor eliminatingit entirely.
After Patterson, Winshipamounts to the right to be presumed innocent

withrespectto whateverelementsof an offensethe legislaturechoosesto
presumea defendantinnocent.JusticePowell does not appearto have
overstatedmatterswhenhe wrotein dissent:
A limitedbut significantcheckon possibleabusesin the criminal
law now becomes an exercise in arid formalities. What
Winship... had sought to teach about the limits a free society

places on its proceduresto safeguardthe liberty of its citizens
becomesa rathersimplisticlessonin statutorydraftsmanship.52
The potentiallyfar-reachingeffects of its decisionwere not entirely
lost on the Pattersonmajority,whichreluctantlyadmittedthatits position
"mayseem to permitstate legislaturesto reallocateburdensof proofby
labelingas affirmativedefensesat least some elementsof the crimesnow
48. See id. at 198-99.
49. See id. at 210-11.
50. See id. at 211.
51. For criticisms of Patterson, see Marina Angel, SubstantiveDue Process and the Criminal
Law, 9 LOY. U. Cm. L.J. 61, 93-111 (1977); Mark W. McLane, The Burden of Proof in Criminal
Cases: Mullaney and Patterson Compared, 15 CRIM.L. BULL. 346 (1979); Irene M. Rosenberg,
WinshipRedux: 1970 to 1990, 69 TEX.L. REV. 109, 116-17 (1990); and Note, Winship On Rough
Waters: The Erosion of the ReasonableDoubt Standard,106 HARV.L. REV.1093, 1093-94 (1993).
52. Patterson,432 U.S. at 224 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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But it soughtto denythe charge,claimingthat
definedin theirstatutes."53
"thereare obviousconstitutionallimits beyondwhichthe Statesmay not
It did not,however,attemptto specifywhatthosecongo in thisregard."54
stitutionallimitsmightbe,55andthe Courthas donenothingto clarifythe
suggestion since. Most importantly,there is nothing in the logic of
Pattersonthat suggests any restrictionson the power of legislaturesto
define offenses. For a limitationon offense definitionwould imply that
there is some content to the notion of an offense that a legislatureis
constitutionallyobligatedto capture.This, however, is precisely what
Pattersondenies.
The pre-Patterson regime, inaugurated a scant three years before

Pattersoneffectively overruledit, had attemptedto walk a middleline
betweenfulljudicialoversightof criminalstatutesandcompletedeference
to state legislatureson the substantivedoctrinesof the criminallaw.
Mullaney v. Wilbur56concerned a challenge to a Maine homicide statute

which,like the New Yorkprovisionconsideredin Patterson,shiftedthe
burdenof persuasionon the defenseof provocationto the defendant.The
Court held that the burden-shiftingprovision did violate the Winship
requirement,
findingthatthe absenceof provocationwas a fact necessary
to constitutethe crimeof murder.57
JusticePowell suggestedthatthe differencebetweenmurderandmanslaughter
in termsof stigmatizationand
restrictionson personallibertyis so significantthatit "maybe of greater
importancethanthe differencebetweenguiltor innocencefor manylesser
crimes."58
Thusdespitethe fact thatthe Maineprovocationprovisionwas
to reducethe gradeanddegreeof the offensefor senstructured
formally
tencingpurposes,the MullaneyCourtused a substantivetest to determine
that its absence is an element of the offense of murder.Any other
approach,JusticePowellargued,wouldleave a legislaturefree to characterizea matteressentialto the definitionof an offense as bearingonly on
the extent of punishment.59
Winship,he argued, was concernedwith
"substance
ratherthanthiskindof formalism."60
It was,however,precisely
thiskindof formalismthattheCourtendorsedso soonthereafter.

53. Id. at 210.
54. Id.
55. It gave the example of a state legislature that wanted to declare an individual guilty of a
crime, suggesting that this would overstep the constitutionalboundariesin question. See id. at 210. But
of course a piece of legislation of this sort would be unconstitutionalfor reasons other than those
provided in Winship.It is not clear, then, whether Winshipitself can be thought of as placing any
limitationson the kind of criminalstatuteslegislaturesdraft.
56. 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
57. See id. at 703-04.
58. Id. at 698.
59. See id. at 698-99.
60. Id. at 699.
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Despite its focus on substance over form, the Mullaney Court did not
question basic positivistic premises about offense definition. This is clear
from the majority's insistence that the permissibility of burden-shifting
provides only a framework for interpreting criminal statutes where the
legislature has chosen to equip defendants with certain defenses. It does
not place the legislature under an obligation to provide defendants with any
such defense in the first place.61 As Justice Powell wrote in his Patterson
dissent:
The Winship/Mullaney test identifies those factors of such
importance, historically, in determining punishment and stigma that
the Constitution forbids shifting to the defendant the burden of
persuasion when such a factor is at issue. Winship and Mullaney
specify only the procedure that is required when a State elects to
use such a factor as part of its substantive criminal law. They do
not say that the State must elect to use it....
[N]othing in
from
a
or
State
abolishing the
Mullaney
Winship precludes
distinction between murder and manslaughter and treating all
unjustifiable homicide as murder.62
It is not implausible to suppose that it was this aspect of Mullaney,
however, that contributed most to its early demise. For the attempt to
articulate constitutional limits on the power of states to engage in burden
shifting without constitutionalizing the underlying matter under consideration is inherently unstable, since, as Patterson insisted, the greater power to
determine whether to grant a certain defense in the first place implies the
lesser power to determine the burden of proof with respect to that element.63 By refusing to articulate general constitutional limitations on the
nature of criminal offenses, Mullaney failed to provide a theoretically
sound basis for constitutionalizing the line between offense elements and
affirmative defenses.64

61. See id. at 698.
62. Patterson,432 U.S. at 228 (Powell, J., dissenting).
63. As the Patterson majorityrecognized, "[t]he Due Process Clause ... does not put New York
to the choice of abandoningthose defenses ... in orderto convict of a crime which otherwise is within
its constitutionalpowers to sanctionby substantialpunishment."Id. at 207-08; see also Martinv. Ohio,
480 U.S. 228 (1987) (holding that placing the burden of proving self-defense on defendant does not
violate the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment).
64. Some commentators, however, object to the "greater power includes the lesser power"
argument.The problemis supposed to lie with the premise that a legislaturemay permissiblypass any
measurewhose permissibilityis implied by an existing power it has. Fromthe fact that a legislaturehas
a certainpower it does not follow that it would ever exercise thatpower, given that it may be politically
infeasible for it to do so. See Ashford & Risinger, supra note 15, at 178. It is as though someone were
to argue that a patently unconstitutionallaw was constitutional because Congress has the power to
amendthe Constitutionto make it constitutional.
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Commentatorsfor their part have mostly reviled Patterson and sided
with Mullaney.65But the literature suffers from an unclear view of the
alternatives.Commentatorsreject Patterson because they think it possible
to articulateintermediatelimitationson the power of legislaturesto engage
in burden-shiftingwithout working a radicalrevision of the powers of federal courts to review the content of criminal legislation. But the "greater
power implies the lesser power" argumentis arguablyfatal to all solutions
of this type. That is, if the argumentof Patterson is correct, there is no
consistent principle to which courts could turn to impose constitutional
limitations on the power of legislatures to shift burdensof proof in isolation, without controllingtheirrightto define offenses.
In light of the foregoing, it is regrettablethat most commentatorswho
reject Patterson's positivism nevertheless do not argue for constitutional
oversight of offense definitions. Instead they continue to search for some
sort of intermediateprinciple, one that would constitutionalizeburdensof
proof without constitutionalizingthe underlyingoffense definition.Barbara
Underwood, for example, has argued for a constitutional principle that
would attachthe reasonabledoubt rule to those factors that serve to establish individual "culpability."66
She suggests that any factor that bears on a
defendant'sblameworthinessshould count as partof the offense definition.
The focus on blameworthinesscan itself be explained in terms of the purpose the presumption of innocence should be taken to serve, namely to
compensate for the unequalresources and power of the state "by putting a
thumbon the defendant'sside of the scales of justice."67
Another solution in this genre is one proposed by Donald Dripps.
Here the purpose served by the presumptionof innocence has to do with
the constitutionalrequirementof notice.68According to Dripps, every element that makes a difference to a defendant's guilt or innocence (whether
cast as offense element or affirmative defense) is subject to the Winship
restriction,on the groundsthat the principle of legality forbids the punishment of those who have not violated the law by its enunciatedterms.69Like
Underwood, Dripps attempts to treat the problem of burdens of proof in
65. See, e.g., Nelson E. Roth & Scott E. Sundby, The Felony Murder Rule: A Doctrine at
Constitutional Crossroads, 70 CORNELL
L. REV.446, 463 (1985). But see Ronald J. Allen, The
Restorationof In re Winship: A Commenton Burdensof Persuasion in CriminalCases After Patterson
v. New York, 76 MICH.L. REV.30 (1977) (arguingMullaneyextended due process protectiontoo far,
and Patterson was a correctionof the Court'serror).
66. See Barbara Underwood, The Thumbon the Scales of Justice: Burdens of Persuasion in
Criminal Cases, 86 YALEL.J. 1299, 1340 (1977). Underwood appearsto understandculpability in a
way that makes it co-extensive with "wrongfulness,"ratherthan in the more technical sense criminal
law scholarsusually have in mind, which makes it a synonym for mens rea.
67. Id. at 1306.
68. See Donald A. Dripps, The ConstitutionalStatus of the Reasonable Doubt Rule 75 CALIF. L.
REV.1665 (1987) (arguingfor notice-basedtheoryof burdensof proof).
69. See id. at 1667.
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of
it fromthe moregeneralquestionof theparameters
isolation,separating
theunderlyingoffense.
solutionsshareis an instrumentalWhatthesevarious"intermediate"
of thepresumption
of innocence,namelyaninterpretation
ist interpretation
that makes the reasonabledoubt rule a proceduraldevice designed to
of
increasethe likelihoodof promotingsomeothervaluethe presumption
of innocenceis not,under
Thepresumption
innocenceis thoughtto serve.70
of constitutional
thisrendering,a requirement
justicein its own right.It is
requiredonly insofaras it promotessome otherprinciplecommentators
deem morefundamental.Ironically,the instrumentalist
approachto burof
dens of proofis as mucha consequence positivisticthinkingaboutthe
notionof an offense as is Patterson'scompletedeference.For on a substantiveconceptionof an offense,Winshipdoes not requirethe additionof
a further,externalvalueto supplythe doctrineits significance.Againstthe
of the notionof an offense,the
of a substantiveunderstanding
background
rule that the presumptionof innocenceapplies to every elementof an
offense has its own meaning.Once one has acceptedthe basic positivist
who seek a way of preservingWinship
premise,however,commentators
are left with a seemingly impossible task. As Dripps aptly explains:
"The challenge,then, is to identify a constitutionalproof requirement
of whatis to be proved."7'
fromanyconstitutional
requirement
independent
accounts:
RonaldAllenhasarguedforcefullyagainstinstrumentalist
If the constitutionalinterest in the reasonabledoubt standard
centerson libertydeprivation,how can the additionof a chanceto
invalidatethe statute?Or,to put
punishment
mitigateconstitutional
it another way, if a state may constitutionallyimprison all
forthirtyyearsby provingbeyondreasonable
intentionalmurderers
doubt only intent and causation,then whateverliberty interest
the defendantconstitutionally
possessesin the contextof homicide
is
prosecutionssurely fully accommodatedby such a statute.
How, then, can the addition of a mitigating circumstancein
the form of an affirmative defense-a factor that reduces
punishment-possibly violate the already fully accommodated
interest?72
But even commentatorslike Allen who are moved by the "greater
powerimpliesthe lesserpower"argumentof Pattersondo not necessarily
endorsea substantiveapproachto offense definition.Allen, for example,
approach,accordingto which
proposeswhathe calls the "proportionality"
70. See id. at 1677.
71. Id. at 1713. Although the Patterson majority attemptedto distinguish the two statutes, its
efforts in this regardwere unconvincing.The PattersonCourt's attemptto distinguish Mullaneyrelied
on the fact that the Maine statute made the defense of provocationa condition of sentencing, whereas
the New York statutemade it a clear affirmativedefense.
72. Allen, supra note 65, at 42-43.
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a state may shift the burden on any element as long as the sentence
authorizedfor the remainingelements of the offense lies within the bounds
of Eighth Amendment proportionalityconstraints.73The Supreme Court,
however, has now largely eliminated proportionalityreview outside the

death penalty area.74If proportionalityis to supply the line between
offensesanddefenses,the conceptwouldhaveto be restoredto ourEighth
Amendmentjurisprudenceand even extended beyond its formerglory.75So

nuancedanddetaileda theoryof legitimatepunishmentunderthe Eighth
Amendmentis not only unlikelyto develop,butalso wouldinvadelegislative prerogativeto a fargreaterextentthanwoulda substantivedoctrineof
offensedefinition.If it is possibleto approachburdensof proofby articulating limits on offense definition instead, we could accomplish the basic
aim of Allen's approachwith less revision of existing doctrine.
This discussion of the presumptionof innocence reveals a tension in
the Americanlegal system's understandingof the notion of an offense. On
the one hand, there is the officially sanctionedtheory of offense definition,
one that says that legislatureshave plenarypower to determinethe boundaries of crime, at least to the extent that the use of the criminalsanctiondoes
not unduly interfere with a fundamentalconstitutionalright. On the other
hand, a proceduralprinciple that is central to our constitutionaljurisprudence depends on the notion of an offense, and that doctrine makes little
sense as a protection for individual liberty unless the notion of an offense

canbe renderedmeaningfulindependent
of the criminalstatutesit is meant
to guide. The standardresponse to this tension has been to attemptto split
the difference-to identify values external to the notion of an offense that
the reasonable doubt rule is supposed to vindicate. But, as we have seen,
theories that do not tie the presumption of innocence to a substantive
notion of an offense leave the constitutional guarantee a ratherthin one,
given that it depends for its contenton the good graces of state legislatures.

73. There is only one other alternative to Patterson, as Allen sees it. This is the "political
compromise" theory, which attempts to determine whether the legislature only decided to adopt the
defense in question on the condition that it was able to shift the burdenwith respect to thatelement. See
id. at 49-50. Allen suggests that the Pattersoncourt did not in fact intend to establish an elements test,
as is commonly supposed, but that its preferredapproachwas the proportionalitytheory Allen himself
favors. See id. While there is little evidence for Allen's interpretiveclaim about Patterson, he seems
correct to favor a proportionalityapproachover both the approachthe Patterson Court actually took,
which is an elements test, and the political compromiseapproach.
74. See Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991) (finding mandatorylife sentence without
possibility of parole for cocaine possession does not violate the 8th Amendment's protection against
cruel and unusualpunishment).
75. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983) (concluding the right to be free from
disproportionatepunishmentguaranteedby the 8th Amendment).
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II
POSITIVISM
ABOUTDOUBLEJEOPARDY

A second constitutional guarantee,the ban on double jeopardy, also
depends on the notion of an offense. In this case, the guarantee'sindebtedness to this notion is textually grounded.The Fifth Amendmentprohibits
placing a person in jeopardy of life or limb twice for "the same offense."76
This clause is thought to prohibitreprosecutionof a defendanton charges
for which he has alreadybeen either acquittedor convicted in a priorproceeding, as well as for multiple punishmentawardedin a single proceeding
for the same offense.77The overwhelming emphasis in both case law and
commentaryis on the former,the ban on successive prosecution.7The ban
on multiple punishment, by contrast, has remained largely undeveloped.
The dominant view of the latter seems to be that it is merely a way of
ensuring that a person convicted of a crime receive only the legislatively
By contrast,a distinct set of constitutionalvalues,
prescribedpunishment.79
such as a defendant's interest in avoiding the cost and embarrassmentof
repeatedtrials, his interestin finality, and the apparentunfairnessof artificially increasing the state's chance of convicting the defendant through
multiple prosecutions,are believed to animatethe ban on successive prosecution.80

The perceived asymmetrybetween the two branches of double jeopardy law is a productof the positivistic understandingof the notion of an
offense. On the multiple punishment side, if the legislature has plenary
power to define offenses, the constitutionalprohibitionon doublejeopardy
has no content of its own. It merely serves to emphasize the legislatively
establishedupperlimit on punishment.On the successive prosecutionside,
by contrast,the doctrine has more content, since it bars a prosecutorwho
76. U.S. CONST.amend.V.
77. See NorthCarolinav. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
78. Recent notable examples of the latterinclude Akhil R. Amar & JonathanL. Marcus, Double
Jeopardy Law After Rodney King, 95 COLUM.L. REV. 1 (1995); George C. Thomas III, Successive
Prosecutions for the Same Offense: In Search of a Definition, 71 IOWA L. REV.323 (1986); Peter
Westen, The Three Faces of Double Jeopardy: Reflections on Government Appeals of Criminal
Sentences, 78 MICH.L. REV. 1001 (1980); and Peter Westen & Richard Drubel, Toward a General
Theoryof Double Jeopardy, 1978 SUP.CT.REV.81, 86.
79. See Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366 (1983) (holding nonconcurrent punishment
awardedin a single trial for armed criminal action and first degree robbery does not violate Double
JeopardyClause).
80. See George C. Thomas III, A Unified Theoryof Multiple Punishment,47 U. PITT.L. REV.1,
1 (1985) ("[A]lthoughboth protections are created by the double jeopardy clause, the prohibitionof
multiple punishments is informed by different values and requires a different analysis than the
protection against multiple trials."). It is concerned with sparing a defendant from repeated and
harassing litigation, both because of the burdens of prosecution and because of the potential for
artificially increasing the chances of conviction. It is also concerned with protecting a defendant's
interest in finality, as well as in protecting his interest in having his trial completed by a particular
tribunal.See also Westen & Drubel,supra note 78, at 86 (articulatingpurpose of ban on successive
prosecutions).
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had lost at trial from reprosecuting the defendant on precisely the same
charges in order to try her luck with a different jury. But in neither case
does the ban on double jeopardy have much intrinsicmeaning. It does not,
for example, prevent a legislaturefrom shaping its criminalprohibitionsin
a way that would obviate these restrictions.A legislature could thus effectively punish multiply or authorize multiple prosecutions for the "same
offense," as long as it sliced its offense definitions finely enough. Courts
and commentatorsattemptto answer these concerns by suggesting that the
guaranteeserves a set of furthervalues that are externalto the ban on double jeopardy itself. This response is the counterpartof the instrumentalist
view of the presumptionof innocence we saw in the preceding Part. But
the requiredexternal values appearto be present in the case of successive
prosecutions but not in the area of multiple punishment.Hence the asymmetry between the two branchesof double jeopardylaw.
The crucial question in interpretingthe ban on multiple punishment
is when two offenses are the "same" within the meaning of the Double
JeopardyClause.81The prevailing test was articulated in Blockburgerv.
United States,82in which the Court said that two offenses are not the same
for double jeopardy purposes if "each of the offenses created requires
proof of a different element."83Suppose the elements of burglary are
"enter[ing] ... a building with purpose to commit a crime therein, ...
unless ... the actor is licensed or privileged to enter'84and the elements of
criminaltrespassare "if, knowing that he is not licensed or privileged to do
so, [a person] ... enters ... any building."85All the elements of the latter
would be contained within the former. The two offenses thus fail the
Blockburgertest, making them the "same"for double jeopardy purposes.
Armed robbery and bank robbery, by contrast, would pass the test, since
each contains an element the other does not contain: use of a weapon and
robberyof a bank,respectively.86
Once again, the Supreme Court here evades the crucial question it
evaded in interpretingWinship'smandate: When does a fact constitute an
element of an offense? And once again, the Court responds with the usual
positivist shibboleth: The elements of an offense are whatever facts the
legislature decides to require a prosecutorto prove by including it in the
definition of the offense.87Just as this response left it open to legislaturesto
81.
82.
83.

This question is of greatrelevancefor the ban on successive prosecutionsas well.
284 U.S. 299 (1932).
Id. at 304.
84.
MODELPENALCODE ? 221.1(1).
85. Id. ? 221.2(1).
86. The Blockburgertest is also sometimes referredto as the "same evidence" test, because it
requiresthat each offense involve the productionof evidence that the other offense does not require.If
two offenses requireproof of all the same facts, or if one offense requiresproof of all the facts required
also to prove a second offense, the two offenses are the "same"for doublejeopardypurposes.
87. See Blockburger,284 U.S. at 303-04.
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shift the burdenwith respectto an elementby eliminatingit from the
offensedefinition,herethereis a draftingtechniquethe legislaturecan use
wheremultiplepunishto obviatethe banon doublejeopardy,particularly
element is concerned.All a legislatureneed do is add nonoverlapping
elements
which
mentsto each offenseit wishesto punishseparately,
may
be irrelevantfor identifyingthe evil the statuteis designedto eliminate.In
theory,for example,a legislaturecoulddistinguishbankrobberyat the top
of the hourfrombankrobberyat half-past,enablingit to assignseparate,
nonoverlappingpunishmentsfor any bank robberythat lasts over half
an hour. The logic of Blockburger,the doublejeopardyequivalentof
Patterson,suggests nothingto disallow it. Once again, the positivistic
guaranteethatdepends
approachto offensedefinitionturnsa constitutional
on the notion of an offense into a doctrineaboutfidelity to legislative
intent.
One way of defendingconstitutionaldoctrineswith the abovestructureis to see themas servingrule-of-lawvalues.If the prosecutionmust
proveeveryelementof a statutorilydefinedoffensebeyonda reasonable
doubt,individualsareon noticeof theconducttheymustavoidif theywish
to remainat liberty. And if they are law-abidingbut are nonetheless
chargedand triedfor a crime they did not commit,the presumptionof
innocencewill maximizethe chancethattheywill be ableto defendthemselveseffectively.Similarly,the banon doublejeopardyarguablyprotects
individualsagainsttheirgovernmentsby providingsome additionalprotectionagainstlawlessprosecutionandpunishment.Thepositivisticinterpretationof these two constitutionaldoctrinesis thus consistentwith a
view of constitutionalguaranteesas ensuringfairnessin the processby
which governmentinvadesthe libertyof its citizens.But while it is not
implausibleto supposethata constitutionalprovisioncould serve such a
these
function,we wouldneedan argumentfor why we shouldunderstand
concerns.
rule-of-law
as
in
doctrines
constitutional
particular vindicating
Indeed,therule-of-lawinterpretation
beginsto look a bit strainedwhenwe
considerthatit wouldresultin bothconstitutionalguaranteesservingthe
samefunction.Why,one mightask, wouldthis functionbe servedby two
differentprovisionsratherthanby a singleconstitutional
concept?Indeed,
thanadequate
more
seems
that
we alreadyhave a constitutional
provision
to the task: the Due ProcessClauseof the FourteenthAmendment.Why
wouldwe havetwo additionaldoctrinesdesignedto reinforcerule-of-law
valuesas well, especiallydoctrinesthatpurportto addressentirelydifferentissues?
turnsout to be particularly
Moreover,the rule-of-lawinterpretation
on
double
difficultto maintainwherethe ban
jeopardyis concerned.For
the commitmentto positivismis more entrenchedhere thanin the presumptionof innocence context. The Court has accomplishedthis by
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of the elementsof an offense
makingevenBlockburger-type
manipulation
In
Missouri
v.
the
Hunter,88
unnecessary.
legislaturehadmadeit an offense
to use a dangerousweaponin the commissionof a felony, to be punished
separatelyfromthe underlyingfelonyitself. The Courtthusfaceda situation in which the legislaturehad expresseda clear intentionto impose
for two offensesthatwerethe "sameoffense"
nonoverlapping
punishments
underBlockburger.89The HunterCourttook the final stepin the direction
of positivism:It relegatedthe sameelementstestto a ruleof statutoryconstruction,makingit applicableonly wherethelegislaturehasnot spokento
the relationbetweenthe two offenses. It thus left the legislaturefree to
authorizemultiplepunishmentfor the "sameoffense,"as long as it did so
clearlyandexplicitly.
To see how revisionarythis move was, considerthe parallelin the
area.Imaginea SupremeCourtdecisionthatleft a legisburden-of-proof
laturefree to presumethe defendantguiltywithrespectto any elementof
an offenseit wished,as long as it announcedits intentionto do so clearly
andunambiguously.
Wouldwe notthinka judgeor commentator
facetious
who theninsistedthatthe presumption
of innocencehadnot lost its characteras a constitutionalguarantee,on the groundsthatit still servedruleof-lawvalues?Yet the imaginedpositionon the presumption
of innocence
follows as seamlessly from Patterson as Hunterdoes from Blockburger.In

bothcontexts,the moreradicalruleallowsa legislatureto do directlywhat
it is constitutionally
permittedto do indirectlyanyway.It is not clear,then,
whatis to be gainedfromforcinga legislatureto pass throughthe largely
meaninglessnotionof an elementof an offense.Whynotdispensewiththe
elementfiction,as PattersonandBlockburger
alreadyallowedwithrespect
to the conceptof an offense, and let the legislaturestate its true intent
of noIndeed,the dueprocessrequirement
clearlyandnonformalistically?
tice would appearto be betterservedthis way, for at least legislatures
wouldhave to presentthe risk of convictionandthe potentialseverityof
punishment
boldly,unobscured
by Byzantineformalities.
Anotherargumentwe saw in defenseof the positivisticapproachto
burdensof proof has a counterparthere.90Surely,the argumentgoes, a
legislaturecould authorizewhatamountsto the samethingas cumulative
punishmentsimplyby attachingit to a singleoffense.If, for example,the
use of a dangerousweaponin the commissionof a crimeis punishableby
five years,andthe underlyingfelony is punishableby ten, the legislature
88.

459 U.S. 359 (1983).

89. At least arguablycumulative punishmentwould have been banned, given the Court's fairly
consistent approachto lesser-includedoffenses.
90. For the following argument,see George C. Thomas III, A BlameworthyAct Approach to the
Double Jeopardy Same Offense Problem, 83 CALIF.L. REV. 1027, 1051-53 (1995) (arguing that
legislature may authorize multiple punishment for two offenses that are the "same" if it can punish
either offense for the full amountseparately).
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could reach the same result as if it could punish these two offenses cumulatively by authorizingfifteen years for either offense alone. If there is no
Eighth Amendment impediment to a fifteen-year sentence for either
offense taken separately,why should a legislature be barredfrom spreading the fifteen years over two separate crimes, where one is the lesserincluded offense of the other? Consider also whether a legislature could
constitutionallypass a statute that made the penalty for bank robbery ten
years, and then provided that anyone convicted of bank robbery will be
punished twice.91Assuming that a twenty-year punishmentfor bank robbery is not constitutionally excessive, it would be odd to suppose that a
legislaturecould not write such a statuteif it could permissibly authorizea
twenty-yearpenalty for the same offense. Why, then, should a legislature
be forbiddenfrom authorizingcumulativepunishmentfor two offenses that
turn out to be the "same offense" under Blockburger?Once again, the
"greaterpower implies the lesser power"argumentprovides supportfor the
positivistic approachto the relevantconstitutionalguarantee.
Notice, however, that the same argumentwould be unacceptable in
the successive prosecutioncontext. For we would not want to conclude that
a legislature could authorizemultiple attemptsat conviction, as long as it
did so clearly and unambiguously.But the logic of Huntercould be made
to apply to the ban on successive prosecutions as well. Surely, the argument would go, the legislaturecould authorizesuccessive prosecutionsfor
a single transactionby slicing its offense definitions very finely. It could,
for example, distinguish the offense of armed robbery from that of bank
robbery,and authorizeseparateand successive proceedings against someone accused of both offenses for a single course of conduct. Now
assuming that the court is following the Blockburger test, the legislature
could authorize successive prosecutions for these offenses, since each
contains an element the other does not contain. It would seem to follow,
according to the above argument,that the legislature could also authorize
successive prosecutionsif one offense were a lesser-includedoffense of the
other, such as if one offense were armed robbery and the other robbery.
And if there is no argumentagainst this, then why should the legislature
not be able to authorize successive prosecutions for a simple, noncomposite offense, say, allowing the state to have two chances, ratherthanone, of
convicting a bankrobber?
There have been a numberof different attemptsto avoid the first step
on this slippery slope, that is, to prohibitmultiple prosecutionsfor closely
relatedoffenses arising from the same transaction.There was, for example,

91. See generally Note, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 YALEL.J. 262, 302 (1965) (arguing that
substantive double jeopardy does not limit a state legislature, but rather only the discretion of the
courts).
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the brief reign of Grady v. Corbin,92in which the Court imposed a sub-

stantivehurdleover and abovethe Blockburgertest, barringa successive
prosecutionthatwouldrely on the facts used to provethe offense of the
previousprosecution.Grady involved a prosecutionfor manslaughter,
whichtookplaceafterthe defendanthadalreadypled guiltyto a violation
for the drunkdrivingthatcausedthe death.93
alonewouldnot
Blockburger
haveruledout the secondprosecution,sincedrunkdrivingis not a lesserincludedoffenseof manslaughter.
TheCourtthereforesoughtto adda substantivedimensionto the conceptof "sameoffense"in orderto forbid
multipleproceedingsin this context.94
Grady,however,was quicklyoverruled by United States v. Dixon,95which effectively returnedthe law of

successive prosecutionsto the simpleBlockburgertest. Commentators,
too, haveproposedvarioussortsof mandatory
joinderrulesto supplement
Dixon.The most sensibleof thesewouldallow a secondprosecutionfor a
greateroffense, one of whose lesser-includedoffenseswas provenin the
initialprosecution,whennew evidenceof the greateroffenseappearsand
the statewas diligentin attemptingto uncoversuchevidenceat the timeof
the first prosecution.96
The defendantwould then receive creditfor time
servedunderthe firstoffensetowardshis punishmentfor the second.The
fact, however,thatthese patchworkadditionshave seemednecessaryto
achievejust resultssuggeststhattheremaybe a flaw in the basicdoctrine.
As in the burden-of-proof
area,the contortionsthatseemnecessaryto protect the banon doublejeopardyreflectthe needto injectsubstanceinto a
doctrinethatlacksit, dueto the lackof substancein the underlyingnotion
of anoffense.
Onefurtherdoctrinalramificationof the positivisticunderstanding
of
the notionof an offenseperhapsservesto illustratethe difficultiesof this
approacheven more clearly. This is the problem of the "unit of
prosecution,"
namelyhow manydifferentinstancesof a given offensethe
defendant'sbehaviorexemplifies.Two offenses that are the "same"for
doublejeopardypurposesmay be cumulativelypunishedif the defendant
committedthat offense more than once. Thus although murderand
arethe "same"offense,a defendantcanbe punishedforeach
manslaughter
if
separately he has two victims.While the pointis an obviousone, it is
often hard to determinehow many times a defendantcommittedthe
92.

495 U.S. 508 (1990).

93. See id.at 510.
94. There is also the collateral estoppel rule ofAshe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970) (establishing a mandatoryjoinder rule for two offenses when the second offense would relitigate facts used to
establish the first offense in an earlier prosecution). Justice Brennan has suggested a more emphatic
version of this approach,namely that all offenses arising out of a single transactionbe prosecutedin a
single proceeding.See id. at 453-54 (Brennan,J., concurring).
95. 509 U.S. 688 (1993).
96. See generally Amar & Marcus, supra note 78.
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offense when the differentinstancesof the offense occurduringa single
courseof conduct.How, then,do we determinewhatcountsas one violation of a prohibitionand whatcountsas morethanone? Withhomicide
offenses the answeris easy: Each dead body correspondsto a different
violationof the homicideoffense,assumingthatthe otherelementsof the
offensearesatisfied.Otheroffenses,however,aremoredifficultto count.
If a person shoots at anothersix times in quick succession,he can be
chargedwithone countof attemptedmurder.If he takesone shoton each
of six successive days, however,he can be chargedwith six counts of
attemptedmurder.How,then,shouldwe individuatedifferentinstancesof
murder?9
thecrimeof attempted
The Courthas not always grappledsuccessfullywith this problem.
Theleadingcase is Brown v. Ohio,98in whichthe defendantstolea vehicle
in Clevelandandwas caughtdrivingthe car nine days laterin Wickliffe.
in Wickliffe,andafterservinga shortjail
He was chargedwith"joyriding"
termandpayinga fine,he was chargedwiththeftin Cleveland.Thedefendanttriedto claimthatthe secondprosecutionwas barredon doublejeopardygrounds,since the Ohio theft statutecontainedall the elementsof
joyriding,an offensefor whichhe hadalreadybeen convicted.9Herethe
SupremeCourt missed what the Court of Appeals had ably understood: that even though joyriding and auto theft are the "same
offense"for doublejeopardypurposes,the defendantcould be punished
morethanonceif he committedthatoffensemultipletimesduringthe nine
days he possessedthe automobile.The Courtof Appealsaddressedthe
problemandfoundthe secondprosecutionpermissibleon the groundsthat
it wasbasedon a secondinstanceof the sameoffense.The SupremeCourt,
problem.It
by contrast,appearsto haveoverlookedtheunit-of-prosecution
foundthe secondprosecutionbarred,on the groundsthat"joyridingand
autotheft... constitute'thesamestatutoryoffense'withinthemeaningof
the DoubleJeopardyClause."'??The only allusionthe Courtmadeto the
problemwas to say: "TheDoubleJeopardyClauseis
unit-of-prosecution
canavoidits limitationsby the
thatprosecutors
not sucha fragileguarantee
into a series of temporalor
crime
a
of
simpleexpedient dividing single
spatialunits."'"'TheCourtdidindicatein a footnote,however,thatmatters
97. The authoris indebtedto ProfessorLarryAlexander,Universityof San Diego School of Law,
for this example.
98. 432 U.S. 161 (1976).
99. See id. at 163-64.
100. Id. at 168.
101. Id. at 169. In this opinion, the Courtran togetherthe problemsof "type"identity (whetheror
not the type of offense in question is the same in both cases) with the problem of "token"identity
(whether there is one or more token of the type of act prohibited). The problem of cumulative
punishment for felony murder and one of its predicate felonies is an example of the former; the
problem of determininghow many instances of joyriding the defendant in Brown exemplifies is an
example of the second. The ban on multiple punishmentwill forbid consecutive sentences if there is
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wouldhavebeendifferenthadthe legislaturespecificallysaidthatjoyriding is a separateoffense for each day the vehicle is operatedwithoutthe
owner'sconsent.02Had the Courtseen the unit-of-prosecution
problem
more clearly, then, it probablywould have adopted the positivistic
restrictions
approachhere as well, namelythatthereareno constitutional
on how many units of prosecutionthe legislaturecarvesout of a single
transaction.
Heretoo the unalloyedpositivisticpositionproducescounter-intuitive
results.Whilewe mighteasilyallowthata legislaturecouldcreatea different instanceof joyridingfor everyday thata defendantretaineda vehicle
withoutits owner'sconsent,couldit also createa differentinstanceof that
offensefor everyhour?Everyminute?Andif it coulddo so forjoyriding,
why not for theft?Couldit establisha separatecountof theftfor eachstone
containedin a piece of jewelry,or a separatecountfor eachdifferenttype
of metal?Whilesuchdivisionswouldprobablynot be attractiveto a legislaturedraftingthe laws of theft,thereis nothingto rulethemout undera
positivisticapproachto offense definition.Nor wouldtherebe any other
constitutional
provisionto standin the way of sucha statute,assumingthat
thelegislaturehadadequatelypublicizedits bizarrestatutoryscheme.
In lightof the difficultiesthe positivisticaccountengenders,it is surhavenotfounda substantivedoctrine
prisingthatcourtsandcommentators
of offense definitionmoreattractive.One possibleexplanationfor this is
that they have studied each constitutionaldoctrinein isolation, with
the resultthattheircommoncore has gone unnoticed.Attemptsto supply
meaningfor eachconstitutionalguaranteehavethusbeen localizedwithin
the constitutionaldoctrinein question,ratherthan spreadover a wider
constitutionalstructure.One commentatorsuccinctlydisplaysthis tendency.He writes,"Sothe questioncomesdownto the following: is there
anything in the Double JeopardyClause definition of 'offense' that
precludes the legislature from authorizing two convictions for a
Blockburgergreater and lesser offense? The answer is negative on
the Court's Hunter analysis .. ."103The same argument appears in

SupremeCourtopinionsas well. JusticeRehnquist,for example,once

wrote: "To the extent that [a substantive] . . . thesis assures that any

particularcriminaltransactionis made up of a determinablenumberof
constitutionalatoms that the legislaturecannot furthersubdivideinto
separateoffenses,'it demandsmoreof the DoubleJeopardyClausethanit
is capableof supplying.'"104
only one token of a single type. It will allow the punishmentif there are either multiple tokens of a
single type, or if there is a single token of more than one type.
102. See id. at 169 n.8.
103. GEORGE
C. THOMAS
JEOPARDY
109 (1998).
Im,DOUBLE
104. Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 701 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting
Westen & Drubel, supra note 78, at 113).
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But this reasoning is reminiscent of the drunksearching for his keys
under a lamppostbecause, as he explains, the light is better. True, there is
nothing in the Double Jeopardy Clause that constrains legislatures in
defining offenses. There need not be. The Clause presupposesthe concept
ratherthan defines it. But assuming that the Double JeopardyClause fails
to supply the meaning of the term "offense," must state law define it
instead? Could the notion of an offense not come from elsewhere in the
Constitution,in this way supplying a common definition that applies to any
constitutionaldoctrinethat relies on that notion? Among other reasons for
searchingfor the meaning of "offense"outside the particularconstitutional
doctrine that employs it, we should expect the concept of an offense to
possess the same meaningin whateverconstitutionalsetting it appears.105
The next Partproposes that we look for the meaning of an offense in
our constitutionaltraditionof liberty. It will argue that this traditionshould
ultimatelyyield a constitutionaltheory of offense definition, given the presumption that the right to liberty creates against the use of the criminal
sanction. This Article, however, will not itself undertakethe task of providing such a theory. Offering a complete theory of offense definition is a
vast undertaking, one that requires careful exploration of a number of
thornyproblems in substantivecriminallaw, as well as a detailed exploration of the constitutionalfoundationfor such a theory. This Article might
be thought of as the preamble to that larger project. It attempts only
to indicate where one might seek to establish such a theory in our
constitutionaltradition.
III
LIBERTY AND THE LIMITS OF CRIMINAL OFFENSES

Philosophical discussions of punishmentoften begin with the observation that because it involves the infliction of pain or other form of
unpleasant treatment, punishment stands in need of justification.'0 As
H.L.A. Harthas written, "[T]he use of legal coercion by any society calls
for justificationas somethingprimafacie objectionableto be toleratedonly
for the sake of some countervailinggood."'07A criterion of adequacy for
any theory of punishment, then, is that it provides an account of when
punishmentovercomes the presumptionagainstthe moral legitimacy of the
acts it involves. A utilitariantheory of punishment,for example, that did
105. See Akhil R. Amar, Intratextualism,112 HARV.L. REV.747 (1999) (arguingfor method of
constitutional interpretationthat makes use of appearanceof same constitutional term in different
contexts).
106. See Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Theory of Punishment, in ESSAYSON DOING AND
325
95-96 (1970); S.I. Benn, An Approachto the Problems of Punishment,33 PHILOSOPHY
DESERVING
(1958); A.G.N. Flew, The Justification of Punishment, 29 PHILOSOPHY291 (1954); H.L.A. Hart,
SOC'Y1 (1959-60).
Prolegomenonto the Principles of Punishment,60 PROc.ARISTOTELIAN
107. HART,supra note 1, at 20 (discussingtheoriesof punishment).
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not subtractthe criminal's loss of utility from the overall social gains of
punishment would fail to meet its burden of justification, since it would
fail to show the practice as worthwhile in the face of the suffering it
imposes.108
This Part will suggest a constitutional analogue of the philosophical
claim about punishment, namely that a constitutional order premised on
notions of individualliberty contains what we might call a "requirementof
justification" for the legitimate use of the criminal sanction. While the
argumentfor this requirementis prescriptive,ratherthan descriptive, this
Part will also suggest that this frameworkallows for what we might call a
normativereconstructionof many of the Court's decisions limiting the use
of the criminal sanction. The suggestion will be that a numberof cases in
this category limit the use of the criminal sanction at least in part
because the deprivation of liberty involved is not adequatelyjustified by
the purposefor which the legislation was enacted. The claim is not that the
Court is explicitly adopting a heightened requirementof justification in
such cases, but rather that this is one way to interpret and to unify a
series of decisions that otherwise look ad hoc. The claim then is that this
interpretiveframeworkcan be defended on normativegrounds, as following from a constitutionalregime's basic commitmentto liberty.
One objection to this proposal will be that federal courts have not
been thoughtpermittedto engage in substantiveoversight of ordinarylegislation on liberty grounds for the last sixty years.'09Not all liberty interests, however, are created equal. Rejecting oversight of economic
regulation on the basis of a generic due process right to liberty does not
entail the rejection of substantivefederal oversight of legislation infringing
the right to be free from bodily restraint.Why must a person's interest in
freedom of contractand his interestin freedomof his physical person stand
on the same footing simply because they both constituteforms of "liberty"
under the Due Process Clause? Moreover, it is difficult to understanda
number of the decisions striking down criminal statutes without thinking
that the Court is willing to impose substantivelimitations on the notion of
a criminal offense that go beyond the minimal requirementof rationality.
These cases suggest that despite the official rejection of liberty-based
review, decisions like Patterson and Hunter"omay be out of sync with our
implicit understandingof the relation between individual liberty and the
use of the criminalsanction.
108. This is arguablythe featurethat condemns utilitarianaccounts of punishment,since they are
unable to exclude cases in which a murder's utility from killing exceeds the disutility the murder
produces.In this case, punishingthe offender would impose greaterdisutilitythan it would prevent.
109. At least the point is clear with respect to economic legislation. See GEOFFREY
STONEETAL.,
CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 834 (1996) ("Since 1937, the Court's abandonment of Lochner-style
substantivedue process review of economic regulationhas been unequivocal.").
110. Missouri v. Hunter,459 U.S. 359 (1983).
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The more specific legal basis for this argumenthas of coursebeen
shrinkingin recentyears, as the substantivereadingof the due process
libertyrightbecomesincreasinglylimited.Liberty,like property,is largely
a formalcategorywhosecontentmustbe determinedby legislation.Decisions like Pattersonreflectthe piecemealreplacementof the substantive
picturewithquitea differentone. The alternativepictureof dueprocessis
fittinglysometimesreferredto as the "positivistic"approachto due process.11It maintainsthatthe libertyandpropertyinterestsprotectedby the
Due ProcessClauseare positivisticconcepts,the contentsof which are
suppliedentirelyby state law. The positivisticapproachto due process
makesthe samepointaboutthe line betweensubstanceandprocedurewe
saw in the burden-of-proof
context,namelythatit makesno senseto conthe underlyingsubstitutionalizeprocesswithoutalso constitutionalizing
stantiverules to which the processconstraintsapply.12The conclusion,
however,is preciselythe reverseof the conclusiona substantivistabout
constitutionalcriminallaw would reach: While the substantivistargues
substancealongwithprocethatthisprovidesa reasonto constitutionalize
dure,the dueprocesspositivistarguesthatit is a reasonfor federalcourts
to leaveprocessto statelegislaturesas well. Theresultis a radicallyweakened conceptionof the Due ProcessClause-the view that due process
servesonly to ensurethatcitizensreceivethoseprotections,whethersubstantiveor procedural,thatstateshave chosento grantthemin theirlawmakingcapacity.13
the centralproponentof due processpositivism,
JudgeEasterbrook,
that
the
conceptualoriginsof the Due ProcessClausesupportthe
argues
positivistapproach.He writes:
[T]heDue ProcessClauseplaceslittleor no legitimaterestrainton
the contentsof legislation.JudgesandPresidentsmustfollowrules
laid down in "law";judges may not act ex parte in important
matters;but Congressmay establishas law such proceduresas it
pleases,subjectonly to the constraintthatit not abrogatecertain

111. Raoul Berger and FrankEasterbrookappearto be two of its central proponents.See RAOUL
AMENDMENT
OFTHEFOURTEENTH
THETRANSFORMATION
BY JUDICIARY:
GOVERNMENT
BERGER,
(1997); FrankH. Easterbrook,Substance and Due Process, 1982 SUP.CT. REV.85; see also Louis D.
Bilinois, Process, the Constitution, and Substantive Criminal Law, 96 MICH.L. REV. 1269 (1998)
(arguing against substantivist theories of due process). For a substantivist critique of due process
positivism, see MartinH. Redish & LawrenceC. Marshall,AdjudicatoryIndependenceand the Values
of Procedural Due Process, 95 YALEL.J. 455, 467 (1986) ("If all aspects of due process are open to
legislative definition, then of what possible value is the constitutional guarantee of due process of
law?"); see also EdwardL. Rubin,Due Process and the AdministrativeState, 72 CALIF.L. REV.1044
(1984) (discussing positivistic renderingsof due process).
112. See supra text accompanyingnotes 62-72.
113. See Easterbrook,supra note 111.
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long-recognizedjudicial procedureswhen fundamentalnatural
libertiesareat stake.14
In our system,Easterbrook
argues,specificprovisionsof the Bill of
Rights replace the reference to fundamentalnaturalliberties. As he
explains, "All that is left are prohibitionsdesigned to compel other
of governmentto follow the legislature'splan.""5The weakdepartments
ness of the Due ProcessClauseunderthis interpretation
is presentedas a
an
rather
than
unfortunate
to
virtue,
necessity.According the due process
the
positivist, Clauseonly has applicationif the executivebranchfalls into
tyrannyor monarchy,sinceits functionis mainlyto ensurethatthe executive conformsto the will of the legislature.In ordinarylaw-abidingtimes,
due processhas no functionat all. Easterbrookcites as evidencefor his
view the factthattheClausehadlittleor no importance
in federalcasesfor
As
he
"The
Due
Process
Clause
manyyears.
explains,
escapedthe Court's
notice for the same reason it escaped the Framers': it stated an
uncontroversial
principlethatwasexpectedto be trivial.""6
Easterbrook's
argumentagainstthedistinctionbetweenprocedureand
substanceis compelling.He suggeststhatit makesno senseto see courtsas
the arbitersof proceduresdesignedto protectsubstantiverightsif state
legislatureshavethe finalwordon the contentof thoserights.Easterbrook
argues accordinglythat "the Court'sdue process cases are incoherent
unlessthe Courthas its own view of substance.""7
He goes on to speculate
that"[t]heCourtmustbe devisingproceduresthatvindicatethe Justices'
views of the relative importanceof differentsubstantiveentitlements,
ratherthanlegislators'views. Substantiveandprocedural
dueprocessturn
out not to be so different.""8
But the difficultyEasterbrook
identifiescan
be solvedin eithertheway favoredby thepositivistsor theway favoredby
the substantivists.The formerdelegatesboth substanceandprocedureto
state law, leaving due processto serve minimalrule-of-lawvalues. The
latterplaces substantivelimitson legislatureswherefederalconstitutional
law controlsthegoverningprocedure.
Bill Stuntzhas arguedin favorof the lattersolution,on the grounds
that"[f]orthe foreseeablefuture,we will continueto live with a regime
that(quiteplausibly)treatscriminalpunishment
as a differentandspecially
seriousdeprivationof 'life, liberty,or property,'andhenceone thatshould
be subjectto significantconstitutionalregulation.""9
If we assume the
constitutionalization
of criminalprocedure,his concernis thatsubstance
will be distortedby legislaturespreciselyin orderto obviateprocedural
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id. at 98 (discussing Coke's view of the notion of due process).
Id. at 99.
Id.
Id. at 115.
Id.
Stuntz,supranote 38, at 2.
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restrictions.Thus, if the substantivelaw is not fixed, constitutionalrestrictions on procedurewill be vacuous. He writes:
The idea of treatingthe criminal sphere as constitutionallyspecial
may make a lot of sense, but if it does, it makes sense for process
and substance alike. Indeed, the point is stronger: without
substantivelimits, importantpartsof the law of criminalprocedure
seem likely to fall apart. In a world in which prosecutors can
choose whom to prosecute, special rules for criminal procedure
logically require substantivelimits on the law of crimes. Without
such limits, the government's natural incentive is to evade or
exploit the procedural civil-criminal line by changing the
substantivecivil-criminal line. The upshot is that we should either
de-constitutionalizemuch of criminalprocedureor create a kind of
substantivedue process for criminallaw.120
Stuntz's argumentfor rejecting the positivistic solution and siding with a
substantiveapproachis pragmatic.But the substantivistwill probablyneed
a strongerargumentfor rejecting due process positivism. For that position
receives strong support from the fact that it would render the Court's
positivistic decisions in the burden of proof and double jeopardy areas
coherent.Furthermore,on no otherconceptionof due process is this true.
The requiredargumentmay lie in the fact that due process positivism
is out of keeping with a number of decisions in which the Court has
articulatedsubstantiveboundarieson the use of the criminalsanction. It is
beyond the scope of this Article to argue for a particulartheory of the due
process liberty interest,or even to offer a doctrinalaccount of specific due
process decisions. But this Part will suggest that there is a strandof our
constitutionaljurisprudencethat rejects the positivist understandingof the
notion of an offense. In this way, the hope is to show that positivism about
the notion of an offense is more costly than one might have thought,given
that it would requirethe abandonmentof importantsubstantivelimitations
on offense definition to which the Court has committed itself. There are
thus substantive reasons for rejecting due process positivism, reasons of
long standingin our constitutionaltradition.
Consider,for example, the cases falling underthe void-for-vagueness
doctrine. As with many restrictions on the criminal sanction, the official
doctrineclothes what are often substantiverestrictionsin formal garb. The
vagueness doctrine purports to address the language in which criminal
prohibitionsare drafted,but many of the cases reveal a concern with what
is draftedratherthan how. Officially, the doctrine requireslegislatures to
word criminal provisions with sufficient specificity to avoid arbitrary
police and prosecutorialenforcementand to provide citizens with adequate
notice of their exposure to criminal conviction. But often the Court's
120.

Id. at 1-2.
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concern with specificity of formulation evinces a substantive judgment
about the harm the prohibitionis meant to avert. This concern was apparent in Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville,'2' where the Court struckdown
a Jacksonville ordinance identifying as vagrants a motley assortment of
undesirable persons, from "rogues" or "vagabonds" to "persons who
use juggling or unlawful games or plays," to "persons able to work but
habitually living upon the earnings of their wives or minor children."'22
The Court offered the usual two grounds for striking down legislation on
vagueness grounds, namely that the statute failed to provide adequate
notice and that it authorizedarbitraryand erraticuse of the police power. It
suggested its concern with the overly invasive characterof the legislation
only obliquely, saying that the presumptionof future criminalitythe ordinance creates "is too precariousfor a rule of law."123This, as well as other
aspects of the opinion, suggest that the Court's concern could not have
been remedied by more careful drafting. More plausibly, the decision
stemmed from a substantivejudgment that both the quality and the quantity of interferencewith the targetedactivities were too restrictiveof liberty
in light of the state's purposes. As RobertPost has written about this case,
"[t]he Courtcould have arguedthat it was constitutionallyforbiddento use
judgments to impose 'lifestyle' norms on unwilling segments of the
population, and the Court in fact trembled at the brink of just such a
substantivedue process analysis."'24
The use of the vagueness doctrine to limit overly invasive legislation
was even clearerin Kolenderv. Lawson,'25where the Courtstruckdown an
apparentlymuch less offensive California statute requiringthose stopped
by police to furnish officers with "'credibleand reliable' identification."'26
The Courtfound the phraseunconstitutionallyvague, on the groundsthat it
failed to specify the meaning of "'credible and reliable.'"127Here the concern with the substanceof the ordinance,and in particularwith the fact that
the infringementof liberty was insufficiently justified, was made explicit.
Justice O'Connor wrote: "Our Constitution is designed to maximize
individual freedoms within a framework of ordered liberty. Statutory
limitations on those freedoms are examined for substantive authorityand
content as well as for definitenessor certaintyof expression."128

121. 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
122. Id. at 163 (strikingdown JacksonvilleOrdinanceCode ?? 26-57).
123. Id. at 171.
124. Robert C. Post, ReconceptualizingVagueness: Legal Rules and Social Orders, 82 CALIF.L.
REV.491,497 (1994).
125. 461 U.S. 352 (1983).
126. Id. at 353-54.
127. Id. at 353.
128. Id. at 357.
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The Courthas recentlyused the doctrineof vaguenessto articulate
these concerns in particularlyvivid colors. In City of Chicago v.
the Courtfounda ChicagoloiteringordinanceunconstitutionMorales,129
Justice
Stevens,in his opinionfortheplurality,emphasizedthat
allyvague.
Chicago's purposeof reducingthe level of gang-relatedviolence was
legitimate:
The basic factual predicatefor the city's ordinanceis not in
dispute.As the city arguesin its brief,"theverypresenceof a large
collection of obviously brazen, insistent, and lawless gang
membersandhangers-onon the publicways intimidatesresidents,
who becomeafraideven to leave theirhomes and go abouttheir
business. That, in turn,imperilscommunityresidents'sense of
safety and security, detracts from property values, and can
ultimatelydestabilizeentireneighborhoods...."We haveno doubt
conductwould
thata law thatdirectlyprohibitedsuchintimidating
be constitutional.130

But JusticeStevenswenton to say thatthe ordinancewas moreinvasive
thannecessaryto accomplishthis end. And he pointedout thatit was not
clearthatthe chosenmethodwas even effectiveat reducinggangviolence,
interestwas
andthattheremightbe othermethodsavailable.Of particular
and
the
for
the Court'sreason thinking legislationvague
overly broad,
namelythatit infringedtoo extensivelyandunnecessarilya protectedconstitutionalrightto liberty.This, despitethe fact thatlibertyitself is not a
"fundamental
right."JusticeStevenswrote:
[A]s the United States recognizes, the freedom to loiter for
innocentpurposesis partof the "liberty"protectedby the Due
ProcessClauseof the FourteenthAmendment.We haveexpressly
identifiedthis"rightto removefromone placeto anotheraccording
as "anattributeof personalliberty"protectedby the
to inclination"
Constitution.
Indeed,it is apparentthatan individual'sdecisionto
remainin a public place of his choice is as much a partof his
libertyas the freedomof movementinsidefrontiersthatis "apart
of our heritage"or the rightto move "to whatsoeverplace one's
own inclination may direct" identified in Blackstone's
Commentaries.131

Outsidethe areaof vagueness,the Courtwas at its boldestandmost
There the city of
explicitin the famous case of Lambertv. California.132
"convicted
for
Los Angeleshadmadeit a crime any
person"to fail to registerwith the police withinfive days of his or herarrivalin Los Angeles,
with each day's failure to register constituting a new violation. A
129.
130.
131.
132.

119 S. Ct. 1849 (1999).
Id. at 1856-57 (citationsomitted).
Id. at 1857-58 (citationsomitted).
355 U.S. 225 (1957).
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"convictedperson"was anyonewho had been convictedof a felony in
California,or whatwouldhave been a felony in Californiaif the convicNo knowledgeof the registrationrequiretion were fromanotherstate.133
ment was necessary.34The SupremeCourt found that the provision
violateddue process.'35
Althoughthe Courtallowedthatthe police power
is "'oneof the least limitable,"'it neverthelessstressedthat"dueprocess
In explainingthatthe statutefailedto
placessomelimitson its exercise."'36
of
the
constitutional
requirement notice,theCourtpointedoutthatit
satisfy
criminalizedconductthat is "whollypassive,"and that "circumstances
which might move one to inquireas to the necessityof registrationare
The Courtreinforcedthis basic substantiveobjeccompletelylacking."'37
tion to the statuteby quotingOliver Wendell Holmes: "A law which
in the averagemember
punishedconductwhichwouldnotbe blameworthy
of thecommunitywouldbe too severeforthatcommunityto bear."'38
It is unfortunate
thatthe Courtdid not makethe groundsfor its holdhave interpretedit as preceing in Lambertclearer.Some commentators
dent against the constitutionalityof strict liability offenses.'39Others have

emphasizedthe absenceof a mistake-of-lawdefense,the fact thatthe statute soughtto criminalizestatus,or the concernaboutarbitrary
enforcement
thatanimatedthe Court'sdecisionsin manyof the vaguenesscases. The
deepestdefectof the provision,however,was arguablythatarticulatedin
the influentialamicusbrieffiled on Lambert'sbehalf.The briefsaid that
the ordinancewas an "unwarranted
invasionof therightof privacy,rightto
and
of a citizenof the UnitedStatesin
and
immunities
liberty,
privileges
thatit penalizesa morallyinnocentandpassivestatusandis notreasonably
restrictedto theevil withwhichit purportsto deal."'40
Theaffirmativeconducttheordinancedemandedwas so muchof a departure
fromthecriminal
law's usualdegreeof intrusioninto privatelife, and the justificationfor
thatdepartureso feeble, thatthe interferencewith libertyit involvedwas
notjustifiable.
Whetherit was Lambert'sinfluence,or simplythe recurrenceof the
clusterof concernsthatLambertraised,subsequentdue processdecisions
exploredandexpandeduponmanyof Lambert'sbasicthemes.In a line of
cases beginning with Robinson v. California,'41the Court's concern with

the criminalizationof status,for example,becameexplicit. A state law
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

See id. at 226.
See id. at 227.
See id.
Id. at 228.
Id. at 228-29.
Id. at 229 (quotingOLIVER
WENDELL
THECOMMON
LAW50 (1883)).
HOLMES,
See Packer,supra note 39, at 129-30.
Id. (quotingBrief of Amicus Curiaefor Appellant,at 21).
370 U.S. 660 (1962).
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making it a misdemeanorto "'be underthe influence of, or be addictedto
the use of narcotics"'142was at issue. The Court,finding the criminalization
of statusrepugnantto the Eighth and FourteenthAmendments,wrote:
It is unlikely that any State at this moment in history would attempt
to make it a criminal offense for a person to be mentally ill, or a
leper, or to be afflicted with a venereal disease.... [I]n the light of
contemporary human knowledge, a law which made a criminal
offense of such a disease would doubtless be universallythoughtto
be an infliction of cruel and unusualpunishmentin violation of the
Eighth and FourteenthAmendments.'43
Although making a substantive comment about the permissible
bounds of the use of the criminal sanction, the Court framed its concern
gingerly. It defended the state's right to regulate narcotics traffic, and
stressed the multiplicity of ways in which a state could seek to attack the
drug tradewithout criminalizingstatus."4The real problem with the measure, it suggested, was that the statutewas more invasive of libertythanreasonably necessary to accomplish the state's end. The Courtwas not saying
merely that the punishment for addiction was disproportionate to the
offense. Its concern was more general. The Court suggested that the use of
the criminal sanction was inappropriatefor dealing with a problem like
addiction.As the Courtsaid: "Evenone day in prisonwould be a cruel and
unusualpunishmentfor the 'crime' of having a common cold."'45True, the
reach of Robinson was sharply limited thereafterby Powell v. Texas,146 in
which the Courtrefused to treatpublic displays of alcoholism in a similar
vein. The Court stressed, however, that liability here was based not on
statusbut on the voluntaryact of takingthe first drink.147
Subsequent cases explored another issue raised in Lambert,namely
whether a mistake-of-law defense is constitutionally mandatory. In
Liparota v. United States,'4 for example, the Courtrejectedthe contention
that a statute criminalizingthe unauthorizedtransferof food stamps could
provide the basis for a criminal conviction without evidence that the
defendant knew his conduct violated the law. It distinguished Liparota
from the long line of cases rejecting a mistake-of-law defense, on the
groundsthat those cases criminalized"a type of conduct that a reasonable
person should know is subject to stringent public regulation and may

142. Id. at 660 n. 1.
143. Id. at 666.
144. See id. at 664-65.
145. Id. at 667.
146. 392 U.S. 514 (1968) (upholding criminal statute criminalizing public drunkenness in
applicationto an alcoholic).
147. See id. at 531.
148. 471 U.S. 419 (1985).
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seriously threaten the community's health or safety."'49The Court suggested that a state could regulate drugs or hand grenades with strict liability, since the items are so manifestly threateningto the health and safety of
the community that potential defendants are effectively on notice of their
vulnerability to criminal prosecution.'50But a state cannot regulate nondangerous items such as food stamps in the same way.15'Here the Court
was even more explicit about the relevance of the type of harmthan it was
in Robinson, in that it specifically made the availabilityof a given defense
turnon the gravity of the harmthe statutesought to prevent.
The foregoing cases mostly do not address the concern with liberty
explicitly. The claim of this Partis accordinglynot that these cases can be
explained in terms of a doctrinal commitment to a general background
right to liberty. Rather, the claim is that there is a jurisprudentialframework within which these decisions would normativelycohere with a strand
of our constitutional tradition. Another line of cases, however, is more
explicitly concerned with liberty, namely the cases striking down legislation in defense of a supposed constitutionalright to privacy. These cases
address the problem of excessive governmentalintrusioninto the lives of
individuals through a subsidiary constitutional value. While the fundamental right such cases addressis officially privacy, not liberty per se, the
distance between privacy and liberty is not very great. Protectinga right to
privacy is anotherway of protectingcitizens from excessive governmental
interference.52
These concerns were perhapsmost in evidence in the Court's opinion
in Griswoldv. Connecticut,'53
where the majorityfound that the decision of
whether to conceive a child "concernsa relationshiplying within the zone
of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees."'54
The Courtmade the connection between privacy and liberty clearest when
it statedthat the Connecticutstatutecould not stand"in light of the familiar
principle, so often applied by this Court, that a 'governmentalpurpose to
control or preventactivities constitutionallysubjectto state regulationmay
not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarilybroadly and thereby
invade the areaof protectedfreedoms.""55Justice Harlan,concurringin the
majority's opinion, would have located the constitutionally protected

149. Id. at 433.
150. See id.
151. See id.
152. As Ruth Gavison writes, "Privacyis derived from liberty in the sense that we tend to allow
privacy to the extent that its promotionof liberty is considered desirable."Ruth Gavison, Privacy and
the Limitsof Law, 89 YALEL.J. 421, 451 (1980).
153. 381 U.S. 479 (1965)
154. Id. at 485.
155. Id. (quotingNAACP v. Alabama,377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964)).
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libertyinterestin the Due ProcessClause itself, ratherthan filteringit
througha fundamental
rightto privacy:
In my view, theproperconstitutional
inquiryin thiscase is whether
this Connecticutstatuteinfringesthe Due ProcessClauseof the
FourteenthAmendmentbecause the enactmentviolates basic
values "implicitin the conceptof orderedliberty."For reasons
stated at length in my dissentingopinion in Poe v. Ullman, I
believe thatit does. While the relevantinquirymay be aidedby
resortto one or moreof theprovisionsof theBill of Rights,it is not
dependenton them or any of their radiations.The Due Process
Amendmentstands,in my opinion,on its
Clauseof the Fourteenth
own bottom.156
the Courtagainarticulatedthe connection
Finallyin Roe v. Wade,157

betweenprivacyand libertywhen it treatedthe concept of privacyas
"foundedin the FourteenthAmendment'sconceptof personalliberty."'58
JusticeStewart'sconcurringopinionendorsedthe legitimacyof substantive reviewof criminallegislation,in light of the Harlanpositionon liberty.As he said:
[T]heGriswolddecision can be rationallyunderstoodonly as a
holding that the Connecticutstatute substantiallyinvaded the
'liberty' that is protectedby the Due Process Clause of the
Griswoldstandsas one
Amendment.As so understood,
Fourteenth
in a long line of... casesdecidedunderthe doctrineof substantive
dueprocess,andI now acceptit as such.59
Like Justice Harlan,Justice Stewartwould have recognized a broad
"liberty"rightin the notionof due processthatcovers morethanthose
freedomsnamedin theBill of Rights.
particular
The classic statementof this positionis of courseHarlan'sdissentin
Poe v. Ullman.'60As he wrote:

[T]hefull scope of libertyguaranteedby the Due ProcessClause
cannotbe foundin or limitedby the precisetermsof the specific
is
This"liberty"
elsewhereprovidedin theConstitution.
guarantees
not a seriesof isolatedpointsprickedout in termsof the takingof
property;the freedomof speech,press, and religion;the rightto
searchesand
keep andbeararms;the freedomfromunreasonable
seizures;and so on. It is a rationalcontinuumwhich, broadly
speaking, includes a freedom from all substantial arbitrary
impositions and purposeless restraints, . . . and which also

recognizes,what a reasonableand sensitivejudgmentmust,that
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id. at 500 (Harlan,J., concurring)(citing Palko v. Connecticut,302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Id. at 153.
Id. at 168.
367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961) (Harlan,J., dissenting).
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certaininterestsrequireparticularlycarefulscrutinyof the state
needsassertedto justifytheirabridgment.161
the Harlanconceptionof libertycapturesa prevalentand
Jurisprudentially,
intuition,
namelythathumanbeingshavea generalizedrightto
compelling
the
as
It is far
liberty,or,
point is often put, the rightto be left alone.162
beyondthe scopeof this Articleto defendthe Harlanconceptionof liberty.
Forpresentpurposes,it is sufficientto pointoutthatthereis a strandin our
constitutional
of thatnohistorythatsupportsa nonspecificunderstanding
tion. The current,quitelimitedaim is simplyto drawout the implications
of this traditionfor the notionof an offense,andto suggestthe tensionin
whichit standswiththe positivistorthodoxy.WhileJusticeHarlanhimself
did not necessarilymeanto establisha broadsourceof limitationson substantivecriminalprovisions,the backgroundrightto libertyfor whichhe
arguedshouldstill provideboundarieson the extentto whicha statemay
interfere with the right of its citizens to be free from bodily
restraint.The basic dividingline betweenthe "Harlansubstantivists"
and
the "Easterbrook
thus
in
to
the
positivists"
emerges response
question
whetherthe notionof "liberty"thatthe Due ProcessClauseprotectsis a
formalconcept,possessingonlythe contentthatstatelaw gives it, or a federalconstitutionalnorm,the boundariesof whichfederallaw mustarticulate. The cases wherethe Courtis calledon to pronouncedirectlyon the
notionof an offense,like PattersonandHunter,takethe formerposition.
The cases wherethe Courthas placedsubstantivelimitson the use of the
criminalsanctionappearto presupposethelatter.
This Articlesuggeststhatas long as thereis a constitutional
commitmentto the notionof libertyin someform,thenthereis constitutional
pressureto rejectthe positivisticconceptionof the notionof an offense.Forit
is the commitmentto libertythat suggestsat least a weak presumption
againstthe use of the criminalsanction.Fromthis it follows thatthe decision to criminalizeis one thatstandsin needof justification.Themostdifficult challenge,of course,is to extracta specific substantivetheoryof
offensedefinitionfromthis requirement
of justification.But thatis a task
betterreservedfor a futureoccasion.Hereit will sufficeto see thattherecognitionof such a presumption
impliesthe availabilityof some theoryof
offensedefinition.
A constitutional
theoryof substantivecriminallaw musthaveanswers
to two questions:First, on what groundsare federalcourtsentitledto
review criminallegislationpertainingto the substantivedoctrinesof the
criminallaw for the adequacyof their content?Wherethe entitlements
enumerated
in the Bill of Rightsareconcernedthe answeris obvious:The
161. Id. at 543.
162. But see RONALD
RIGHTS
DWORKIN,WhatRights Do We Have?, in TAKING
SERIOUSLY
266,
268-72 (1978) (arguingagainstthe idea of a generic rightto liberty, as opposed to particularliberties).
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Constitutionexplicitly equips citizens with certainrights against their governments, such as the right to freedom of speech, and where legislation
infringes one of these rights, federaljudges may invalidate the legislation
to protect the right if the state cannotjustify the measureby reference to a
"compelling state interest."But outside the area of fundamentalrights the
answer does not come easily. While the traditionof substantivedue process provides the most likely source of these restrictions,due process positivism suggests that a legislature has unboundeddiscretion to decide what
to criminalize and how to do so, as long as the statutedoes not infringe a
fundamentalright. Large portions of our constitutionaljurisprudenceof
liberty, however, belie this suggestion. And if there is a general due process interest in liberty, then at least some of the justifications a state could
offer for the use of the criminal sanction would fail to override the backgroundrightcitizens have to be free from punishment.
The second question a constitutional theory of substantive criminal
law must answer follows from the first: What, specifically, are the limits
on the use of the criminal sanction that federal courts are entitled to
enforce? When, in other words, is the legislature's reason for the infringement of liberty sufficiently powerful to rebut the backgroundpresumption
against the use of the criminal sanction? The rationalityrequirementthe
Due Process Clause imposes on all legislation supplies the answer under
currentdoctrine,but it should be clear that the minimal notion of rationality is inadequateto explain the Court'sliberty-protectingdecisions.
Rationality review is usually understood as containing two separate
tests: First, the legislature's end in passing the legislation must be
"legitimate,"and second, the legislation must be "rationally"relatedto this
end. When is a means "rationallyrelated"to the end? The answerthe Court
has generally adoptedis that a statuteis rationallyrelatedto the state's end
when it tends to promote the end. The cases we have considered in this
Part cannot plausibly be described as based on a failure of rationality.
Instead, what appears to have driven the Court in these cases is the idea
that legislatures may not invade liberty more than is reasonablynecessary
to advance legitimate state purposes. This appears to be a particularly
compelling way of understandingthe vagueness cases. The prohibitionon
status offenses, the implicit limitations on strict liability, and even
the cases articulatinga fundamentalright to privacy, arguablyevince the
same concern. In each case, the Court's primaryobjection appearsto have
been not that the legislature exceeded its authorityby attemptingto deal
with problems like vagrancy, but ratherthat there were alternativemeans
available to it that would be dramaticallyless invasive and would accomplish this same end.
The concern with the unnecessary invasiveness of liberty-infringing
measureswould help to explain the apparentdifference between review in
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the criminal arena and review elsewhere. Arguably our Constitutioncares
about alternativemeans available to a legislature where liberty-infringing
legislation is concerned,even though it does not care about this elsewhere.
And this would make sense given the presumption against criminal statutes. Within certainbroad outlines, this presumptionought not to be overcome unless the state can show it did not frivolously ignore a less libertyinfringingmeasureavailableto it. The idea that liberty infringementsought
to be minimized thus points in the direction of a theory of offense definition. What one would need to identify is a minimum set of elements for
each offense that allows the offense definition to meet the above test. The
decision to criminalize a given type of conduct would then meet its burden
of justification if it can be shown that given the purpose of criminalizing
that behavior, the measure adoptedwas roughly the least liberty-infringing
formulationreasonablyopen to the legislature.Whetherthis suggestion can
be made doctrinally compelling would require extensive furtherexploration. But the discussion of this Part should be sufficient to show that there
are basic aspects of our constitutionaljurisprudencethat lend themselves to
a substantivetheory of offense definition.Positivism aboutthe notion of an
offense is not inevitable.

IV
THE HARMPRINCIPLE

The argumentof the Article thus far has been that the liberty interest
of citizens creates a presumptionagainst the use of the criminal sanction,
and that therefore criminal prohibitions stand in need of justification. In
this way, we may be able to tease rough boundaries on the notion of an
offense out of the right to liberty. The requirementof justification restricts
a legislature in the conduct it may prohibit, as well as in the invasiveness
of the prohibitions themselves. A criminal prohibitionthat failed to identify a harmof sufficient magnitudeto overcome the presumptionagainst it
would be illegitimate, since it would constitutean unjustifiableinterference
with liberty.
Thus far, however, we do not have a picture of the kind of theory of
offense definition that would allow a court to determinewhen a legislature
had met its burden of justification. To develop such a theory, we must
"translate"the backgroundright to liberty into a set of substantiveprinciples for determining the legitimate use of the criminal sanction. This is
accomplishedby identifying a principleor set of principlesthat determines
when a criminal statutesatisfies its burdenof justification. By specifying a
theory of justification, it should be possible to identify a set of core elements for each legitimate offense. It should also be possible to determine
when a state's purpose is insufficiently compelling to justify the decision
to criminalize in the first place. We have thus arrived at a frameworkfor
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answeringthe question"Whatis a crime?"withwhichwe began.A crime
in a liberal order is prohibitedbehaviorwhose harmfulnessjustifies
restrictinga person'slibertyin orderto preventor punishthatbehavior,
accordingto whatevertheoryof justificationthatorderaccepts.To completethe definition,we mustfill in the frameworkwitha specifictheoryof
justification.
Onetheoryof justificationis thatprovidedby the legalmoralist:The
rightto libertymaybe limitedonly forthelegitimatelegislativepurposeof
punishingor preventingmorallywrongfulconduct.As JoelFeinbergcharacterizesthisposition:
The pure legal moralist in the strict sense demands that the law

preventand/orpunishinherentimmoralitieseven when they are
harmless(because voluntaryor consentedto) and unoffending
(becausenot forcedon the attentionof unwillingobservers).He
rests his entire case on the desirability of eliminating and
preventingstatesof affairswhoseevil, eventhoughfree-floating,is
intuitivelymanifestandextreme.163
Underat leastone versionof this thesis,the legitimacyof thataim can be
accountedfor by a retributivetheoryof punishment,and thus the backdeserved
groundrightto libertyis limitedby theneedto inflictpunishment
As
Moore
defends
this
Michael
position,
by wrongdoing.
whencombinedwith the principleof legalityand
[R]etributivism,
the insight that law as law does not even primafacie obligate
citizen obedience, yields the legal morality theory of proper
legislativeaim: all andonly moralwrongsshouldbe prohibitedby
the criminallaw, for the reasonthatsuchactions(or mentalstates)
arewrongful(orculpable)anddeservepunishment.'64
In Moore's version, the retributiveprinciple of punishmentsets the
boundariesof what he calls our "derivedright to liberty,"namelythe
rightnot to have governmentregulateone's behaviorfor the wrongreason.'65The derivedrightto libertyestablishesa link betweena theoryof
punishmentand the scope of libertyrights,for it is only if the criminal
sanctionis imposedfor legitimatepunitiveends thatthe derivedrightto
libertyis adequatelyrespected.For the legal moralist,the onlylegitimate
focuson moralwrongdoing.
punitiveendsaresuppliedby the retributivist
The legal moralist'sdefinitionof an offense wouldthus be conductthat
meritsan infringementof liberty,in view of its fulfillmentof the conditionsof a retributive
Accordingto thelegalmoralist,
theoryof punishment.
this
condition.
all andonlyimmoralactssatisfy
8-9
WRONGDOING
LAW:HARMLESS
LIMITS
OFTHECRIMINAL
THEMORAL
163. 4 JOELFEINBERG,
(1988) (discussing broadand narrowsenses of legal moralism).
164. MOORE,
supra note 1, at 754.
165. Id. at 751.
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Thereare, however,familiarargumentsagainstlegal moralism,particularlystemmingfromthe difficultyof defendingthe tight connection
betweenlaw andmoralitythattheoryasserts.First,thereis the problemof
accountingfor malaprohibitacrimes.Whileit is not implausibleto think
of the traditional
commonlaw crimesas targetingimmoralacts,we cannot
think
of
modern
regulatoryoffenses in this way. Second is the
easily
of
problem explainingwhy we fail to criminalizea numberof actsthatare
even
manifestlyimmoral.Lyingto a friend,backingoutof a commitment,
on
a
are
not
but
lover
are
cheating
normally
punishable, they
usually
thoughtimmoral.Thesetwo objectionsto legal moralismhavestruckmost
scholarsas sufficientgroundsto rejectthataccountof the notionof crime.
Moorehimself,however,has endeavoredto defendlegal moralismagainst
them.
In responseto the firstdifficulty,Mooresuggeststhatmalaprohibita
crimesareones in whichthe legislatureaims instrumentally
at somemorWhere
mala
in
se
are
crimes
the
concerned, legislature
ally wrongact-type.
includesthe morallywrongact-typewithinthe statementof theprohibition
itself. Wheremalaprohibitacrimesare concerned,by contrast,the legislatureforbidsan actbecauseit tendsto producea morallyundesirable
state
of affairs:

Malaprohibitacrimes are createdto preventsome bad state of
affairsfromoccurring.Drivinga motorvehiclewithouta driver's
license,forexample,servesto preventloss of life andotherinjuries
to personsor propertyby keepingthe unskilled,the ignorant,and
the incapacitatedoff the roads.The morallyideal act-typeis the
one that maximallyachieves this intrinsicallyvaluablestate of
affairs.... Thereare thus still morallydictatedact-typesbehind
malaprohibitacrimeseven if such act-typesare the productof
instrumentalcalculation(ratherthanof the intrinsicallywrongful
natureof suchact-types).166
Moore'ssolution,however,seemsvulnerableto the followingobjections.First,it is not possibleto identifya "morallyideal"act-typefroman
intrinsicallyvaluable state of affairs; nor is it possible to identify a
"morallydictatedact-type"from a morallybad state of affairs.In each
case, the problemis thatthereis no single type of act thatis associated
with the avoidanceof thatstateof affairs.Considerthe rulethatrequires
arrive
peopleto deferto the driveron theirrightwhencarssimultaneously
at a four-wayintersection.Theundesirablestateof affairstheruleis meant
to avoid is a trafficaccident.But any numberof rules could maximally
contributeto the avoidanceof this state of affairs.For example,drivers
could be requiredto defer to the driveron theirleft insteadof on their
right, or they could be instructedto defer to the largest vehicle, the
166.

MICHAEL
ACTANDCRIME
339-40 (1993).
MOORE,
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smallest vehicle, the brightest or the darkest, the newest or the oldest. In
general, rules meant to facilitate coordination, which many mala prohibita
offenses are, have a certain arbitrariness to the act-types they identify, for
any number of act-types will maximally contribute to producing a certain
end.167 How do we determine which act-type it is justifiable to prohibit and
which it is not?
Another difficulty with Moore's solution is that mala prohibita crimes
are often entirely unrelated to any item of moral concern. Moore is correct
to suggest that mala prohibita crimes are designed to avoid undesirable
states of affairs. But a state of affairs is not by itself an item of concern to
morality. A traffic accident is, from a certain standpoint, an undesirable
event, and the state of affairs in which such an accident has occurred is
also undesirable, but so are headaches and avalanches. If avoidance of traffic accidents is a sufficiently morally worthy end to justify the use of the
criminal sanction, then is not the avoidance of headaches and avalanches as
well? It is not clear how exactly the legal moralist will accommodate mala
prohibita crimes and still retain limits on the use of the criminal sanction.
In response to the second objection, Moore argues that while it is
always a reason in favor of punishing an act that it is immoral, the reason
need not be dispositive. Legislatures have other legitimate goals that may
override their concern with morality. It is not clear, however, that the legal
moralist can accommodate this modification. For if the immorality of the
conduct is not a sufficient condition for criminalization in these de minimis
cases, what reason is there to suppose that it is ever a sufficient condition?
And if an act's immorality is never by itself a sufficient condition for prohibiting it, the legal moralist's position may not ultimately stand apart from
any number of other theories of criminalization, since many theories could
take the position that an act's immorality is a necessary condition for
criminalizing it and still think the moral status of an act relatively unimportant.

167. Moore's account of double jeopardy makes use of this framework.The essential idea is that
two offenses are the "same"for double jeopardy purposes if they share the same morally salient acttype. See id. at 337. Consider, however, the above criticism as applied to that account. In the case of
crimes that are mala in se, a court trying to determine if two offenses are the "same" for double
jeopardy purposes must locate the morally wrong act-type the legislature had in mind in draftingeach
offense, presumablywhetheror not the legislaturehas properlyidentifiedthe act-typein question.Then
a judge must decide whether the two offenses have a morally wrong act-type wholly or partially in
common. If so, the two offenses cannotbe punishedcumulatively,and otherwisethey can. But how is a
judge supposedto identify the relevantact-type in the case of crimes that are mala prohibita,given that
no ideal act-type can be inferredfrom the specification of a state of affairs as undesirable?If the acttype analysis means that a judge must look to ideally wrong act-types ratherthan to the elements of an
offense, it is not clear how she is supposed to decide whether crossing the center median in a vehicle
and reckless driving are the same offense.
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These argumentsagainst the legal moralist are far from complete.168
Undoubtedly Moore would have compelling responses to them. Without
purportingto have disposed of the legal moralist's approachto crime, we
might nevertheless find these difficulties sufficiently worrisometo investigate an alternative.Insteadof seeking to justify interferencewith libertyby
the need to punish morally wrong acts, one might think of the relevantjustification as stemming from the harmfulnessof the prohibitedconduct. We
might, in short, adopt the "harmprinciple"as the justification for interfering with liberty. In On Liberty,169Mill wrote, "the only purpose for which
power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized
The harm
community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others."170
differs
from
moralism
because
the
notion
of
harm
is not
principle
legal
necessarily connected with the moral characterof the action that produces
it. Accordingly, the avoidance of harm provides a morally neutrallegislative aim, one, however, that seems capable of supplying a substantivejustification for infringing liberty. And just as legal moralism suggests a
retributivetheory of punishment,so the harm principle implicates its own
theory of punishment, one that serves to link the backgroundconcept of
liberty with the notion of a criminal offense. There is no convenient name
for such a theory, but it is easily characterized.The theory of punishment
that goes with the harmprinciple is a theory that views punishmentas justifiable insofar as it focuses on the avoidance of harm, ratherthan on the
avoidanceof immoralacts.'71
As Moore points out, there are a number of criticisms of the harm
For example, he might question
principle a legal moralist might make.172
why the infliction of harmprovides a good reason to limit liberty. What is
it about harm-preventionthatjustifies governmentalcoercion? Moore suggests that most harm inflicted on others is morally wrong, and that this
provides the real justification for interfering with harm-producingconduct.173Thus, he would argue,harmis not in and of itself an adequatejustification for restrictingliberty. It appearsto be so only insofar as harminga
person normally wrongs him. We also sometimes punish "harmless
wrongdoing,"such as defamationof the dead or public nudity. Are we not
right to punish such conduct on the grounds that it is morally
168. For a thoroughexplorationof the problemswith legal moralism,see 1-4 JOELFEINBERG,
THE
MORAL
LIMITS
OFTHECRIMINAL
LAW(1984-88).
169. MILL,supra note 44.
170. Id. at 10-11.
171. One might suppose this describes a deterrence-basedtheory of punishment,but this would be
incorrect. Deterrence is a theory about the correct quantum of punishment, rather than a theory
identifying which acts to punish and why. The point is confusing, since retributivismprovides both an
answer to the question of what to punish and an answer to the question of how much punishmentis
due. Othertheories of punishmentaddressthese questions separately.
172. See MOORE,
supra note 1, at 753.
173. See id.
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Finally,Moorepointsoutthattherearemanyinstancesof
reprehensible?'74
harm
that
are not punished,such as harmingsomeonethrough
causing
economic competition.Does that not show that punishmentcannotbe
directedtowardstheavoidanceof harm?175
Whilethesepointsarecompelling,they arefar fromconclusive,and
in lightof the followingresponses,theyarenot generallythoughtto clinch
the case againsta harm-basedtheoryof criminalprohibition.First,from
involve morallywrongful
the fact thatmanyinstancesof harm-infliction
conduct,it does not follow thatthe moralwrongfulnessof the conductis
thereasonforpunishingit. Indeed,Moore'sargumentseemsto reversethe
usualway we thinkof the relationbetweenimmoralityandharm:We are
normallyinclinedto thinkof conductas morallywrongfulbecause it is
harmful,ratherthanthe otherway around.It thusseemsmoreplausibleto
say that the reasonwe punishcertainacts and the reasonthose acts are
wrongfulis the same,namelythatthe conductinflictsharm.Second,it is
not at all clearthatthe supposedcases of "harmlesswrongdoing"arenot
predicatedon the harmprincipleafterall. It is plausiblethata personcannot be harmedafterhe is dead,butthatdoes not meanthata law prohibitSuchactscan
ing defamationof the deaddoes not aimat harm-prevention.
it
is
to heara
be harmfulto thosewho arealive,perhapsbecause disturbing
loved one defamed,or becauseit createsinsecurityto the living to know
theymightbe defamedafterdeath.Publicnuditymaynot appearto inflict
any identifiableharm,butit mayinflicta morediffuseharm,for example,
the erosionof social practicesof respectfor bodilyintegrity.76Third,no
one supposesthatall harmsareproperobjectsof punishment.
Accordingly,
the harmprincipleas providingsufficientcondiwe shouldnot understand
Whatthe notionof harmsupplies
tionsfor thejustificationof punishment.
in this context is a thresholdcondition for justified punishment,the
absenceof whichmakesthe morepoliticalandpragmaticconsiderations
that legislaturesdebateirrelevantto the permissibilityof the proposed
criminaloffense.
Whataboutaccountingfor mala prohibitacrimes?Does the harmbasedtheoryfarebetterthanlegal moralism?It is easierto justifyprohibreasonson a harm-basedaccountthanit is
iting conductfor instrumental
on the comparablelegal moralistaccount.For if the use of the criminal
sanctionis justifiablein orderto avertharm,it does not muchmatterif the
prohibitedbehavioris productiveof somefurtherharmor whetherit is the
behavioritself thatis harmful.In eithercase, the requiredset of elements
174. See id.
175. See id.
176. Feinberg,who mountsa compelling defense of the harmprinciple,neverthelessconcedes that
such cases must be addressedoutside that principle. He accordingly suggests supplementingthe harm
principle with the "offense principle," which would justify prohibiting conduct that causes serious
offense as well. See generally 2 FEINBERG,
supra note 168.

20001

POSITIVISMAND THENOTIONOF AN OFFENSE

377

wouldstemfromthe natureandmagnitudeof the harmin termsof which
the use of the criminalsanctionis justified.Mala prohibitacrimesthus
appearto be easily accommodatedon a substantiveaccountof offense
definition,as long as the principleof justificationthat theory supplies
remainsmorallyneutral.
Thusfarthis Articlehas suggestedthata liberalorderis committedto
a backgroundrightto libertythatcan be justifiablyinfringedonly for the
If this is correct,it is plausibleto thinkthatit
purposeof harm-avoidance.
also imposesa requirement
on legislaturesto draftcriminaloffensesin a
way thatcontainsa clear specificationof the relevantharm.This is the
functionthat the core elementsare meantto serve: A criminaloffense
mustbe constitutedby the basic elementsnecessaryto identifythe harm
thatjustifiesthe punishmentassociatedwiththatoffense.A legislaturecan
alwaysaddadditionalelements,overandabovethose minimallyrequired
to meet the burdenof justification.But a criminaloffense is underspecifiedwhen the harmthe statutetargetsis insufficientto justify the
degreeof interferencewithlibertythe statuteimposes,takinginto account
the othermeansavailableto a legislaturefor satisfyingits purpose.Andif
the conductthe statutetargetsis not a harmat all, thereis no offensedefinitiona legislaturecouldselectthatwouldjustifyits prohibition.
When the requirementof justificationis interpretedin light of the
harmprinciple,it providesa plausibleway of understanding
a numberof
the cases we consideredin the previousPart.Vaguelywordedstatutesthat
fail to identifytheharmtowardswhichthe criminalmeasureis directedare
conduct
problematicbecausethey will oftenbe used to targetnonharmful
Onecannotbe surefromthe termsof the statute
by policeandprosecutors.
alonethatthe restrictionon libertywill be justifiedby the harmfulnessof
the conductthe statuteprohibits.Moreover,we might say that a statute
does not satisfyits burdenof justificationunlessthatjustificationis publicly availablefromthe explicittermsof the prohibition.The vagueness
cases thus help us to refinefurtherthe requirementof justification.That
demandsnot only thatthe criminalizedconductproducesome
requirement
harmthe legislaturehas a validpurposeto prevent,but also thatthe harm
be sufficientlyidentifiableto makethe statute'sjustificationapparentfrom
thetermsof theoffense.
Thesethemesalso underliethe prohibitionof statusoffensesandthe
mistake-of-lawcases we considered:The identificationof the prohibited
conductmustleave potentialdefendantsa way of avoidingthe harmthe
law seeksto prevent,a conditionthatfollowsfromthegoal of harmavoidance.Thatopportunity
is not availableif the offensecriminalizesa stateof
instead
of
behavior,or if it criminalizeswhollypassivebehavioror
being
other behaviorthat the offenderhad no reason to know was harmful.
Notice that this opportunityneed not be availableon a legal moralist's
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account, since there is no reason to think that a person cannot deserve
punishmentfor being in a depravedmoral state. It would also explain why
it is not a defense that the defendantdid not know his conduct was criminal, except in those cases of mala prohibita where the prohibition has
received inadequate publication. It is a defense, however, if he did not
know its natureand effects, a disparitythe harmtheory readily explains. If
the conductis harmfulin and of itself, as is the case with mala in se crimes,
the defendant is on notice of the possible illegality of his conduct. If the
conduct is only instrumentallyconnected to some harmful state of affairs,
the defendant cannot be expected to know that his conduct is illegal, and
thus he must be placed on notice throughpublication.
In the privacy cases, the Courtfound that the balance between the liberty interest the criminal statute infringed and the harm the legislature
sought to prohibitwas not sufficient to meet the burdenof justification. In
some cases, such as Griswold,"77the invasion of liberty may be particularly
objectionable because the offense may not identify anything one could
plausibly consider a harm in the first place, either in itself or
instrumentally.It is not surprising,therefore,that the cases striking down
statuteson privacy groundsmostly concern consensual conduct or conduct
that does not affect the interests of persons other than the actor.78 The
"harm"the statuteseeks to preventin such cases is minimal or nonexistent,
and thus the Courtoften sees the infringementof liberty as unjustified.
There is interesting jurisprudentialprecedent for turning to a harm
principle to develop a theory of justified criminalization.Bentham seems
to have had something of the sort in mind when he insisted that laws,
Bentham's idea of
criminal offenses in particular,must be "complete."'79
what makes a law complete is tied to the notion of harm. He writes that
every law must be made "upon the consideration of some mischief' the
legislature wanted to discourage.80Whether a law is adequatelypremised
on the preventionof a given harm is not a matterto be left entirely to legislative judgment, for Benthamoffered the requirementof completeness as
a criterionfor assessing legislation. He arguedthat a law is incomplete "in
point of design" if the mischief the statute specifies "deviates from that
which... it is thought [the legislator] should and might have formed to
177. Griswoldv. Connecticut,381 U.S. 479 (1965).
178. The notablepossible exceptions to this are the abortioncases. But the overwhelmingmajority
of those inclined to treatabortionas a matterfor privatechoice also are inclined to think that a fetus is
not the bearerof separateinterests of its own. Those, like JudithThomson, who wish to argue for the
permissibility of abortion even under the hypothesis that the fetus is a bearer of interests, however,
need not reject the harmprinciple.They need only think that the harminflicted is not sufficiently great
to warrantinterferencewith the liberty right of the mother to choose. See JudithJarvis Thomson, A
Defense of Abortion, 1 PHIL.& PUB.AFF.47, 61-62 (1971).
156-83 (H.L.A. Hart ed., 1970) (describing how
OF LAWSIN GENERAL
179. JEREMY
BENTHAM,
complete law varies accordingto fullness of pattern).
180. Id. at 160.
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himself."'81In this light, it should seem somewhat ironic that Bentham is
ranked as among the most committed proponentsof legal positivism. The
charge is not altogetherincorrect, given his adherenceto a command theory of law. But he nevertheless allows for some importantrestrictionson
the notion of "law" that eliminate some commands from counting as law,
in particular,those that fail to identify discrete harms.Thus the application
of the harm principle to the basic identification of criminal offenses this
Article has proposed echoes Bentham in its suggestion that any harm or
evil the legislature wishes to prohibit must satisfy certain internal conditions for its own "completion."A theory of offense definition is simply a
way of requiringthat legislative attempts to discourage harm identify the
relevantharmin its totality if the interferencewith the liberty of subjectsis
to be constitutionallyjustifiable.
This Article will not make specific proposalsfor when a court should
judge the harm principle satisfied and the burden of justification for an
offense definition met. But it would nevertheless be useful to consider
more concretely how a harm-based theory of offense definition would
work in at least one fairly starkexample. Once again, the currentArticle is
mostly concerned with suggesting a possible framework within which a
constitutional theory of offense definition might be developed. But the
plausibility of the framework will be enhanced by showing how such a
theory might operate in the "easy" cases, namely the cases in which our
intuitionsare reasonablyclear.
A typical definition of rape is sexual intercoursewith anotherperson
force
or threatof force against the will and without the consent of the
"by
other person."'82Suppose a legislature is concerned about the difficulty of
gaining convictions in rape cases due to problems of proof. It therefore
decides to allow the prosecutorto establish a primafacie case on the basis
of intercourse alone, shifting the burden to the defendant to disprove the
charges by showing that he acted without force and with the consent of the
other person. Would it be permissible for a legislature to structure its
offense definition this way? As we saw in Part I, Patterson was right to
equate the restrictionson the prima facie case with the restrictionson the
definition of the offense itself. The question, then, is whether it should be
impermissiblefor a legislatureto criminalizerape itself in this form. While
the point is not entirely beyond argument,a legislatureought not to be able
to forbid consensual intercoursebetween adults. We can put the point in
general, jurisprudential terms by suggesting that sexual intercourse
between consenting adults is not a harmor evil that could justify the use of
the criminal sanction. Under the harm principle, a criminal offense whose
purpose it is to prohibitimmoral but nonharmfulconduct is not justifiable
181.
182.

Id.
MD. CODEANN.art. 27, ?463(a)(1) (1957).
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as a validinfringement
of liberty.A courtcouldthusfindthattheproposed
rapestatutefailedto meetits burdenof justification.
But what aboutthe Georgiaanti-sodomylaw the court upheldin
Bowers v. Hardwick?'83If the Courtis predominantlyconcernedwith
harm,andtheharmtheGeorgialegislaturesoughtto avertby criminalizing
of the liberty
sodomywas sufficientto justifythe significantinfringement
interestcitizenshavein sexualautonomy,arguablythe moreseriousharm
of rape couldjustify vastly greaterinfringementson that same interest.
Wouldthe harmprinciplehelp to supplya theoryof offense definitionin
thiscase?
Bowers,however,is a ratherstunningillustrationof why a harmbasedtheoryof justifiedcriminalization
is to be preferredto bothpositivaccountof
ism andlegalmoralism.HadtheCourtrecognizeda harm-based
offense definitionas a legitimateway of protectingindividuallibertyit
probablywould have found the use of the criminalsanctionin Bowers
theoryin the placeof
unjustified.At the veryleast,adoptinga harm-based
either a morality-basedtheory (legal moralism) or no theory at all
(positivism)wouldfocus debateaboutsuchstatutesin the rightplace.The
questionwouldbecomewhetherforbiddingconsensualsodomywas suffiof
cientlyimportantto publicwelfareto justifythe extensiveinfringement
such as this mightbe
libertyinvolved.At any rate,private"immorality"
for
nonharmful.
its
to
be
prohibitionwould
Any argument
presumed
While
muchwouldhave
of
its
ill
on
others.
effects
requirea demonstration
to be filled in to articulatefully a theoryof harm,our traditiongenerally
adultsarethe bestjudgesof theirown interests,
assumesthatnonimpaired
andthusthe fact thatconductis consensualis usuallysufficientto suggest
nature.
its nonharmful
Now returnto the hypotheticalrapestatutewe consideredabove.In
this case, the harmor evil, namelyforcingintercourseon an unconsenting
is moresignificantthanintercoursebetweenconsentingadults.
participant,
the legislativepurposeas discouraging
At least if we wereto characterize
forcedintercourse,the aimof the statutewouldbe quitea compellingone
on a harm-basedapproachto justification.The questionthen would be
thannecessaryto
whetherthe chosenmeasurewas moreliberty-infringing
less libertya
there
was
or
whether
in
harm
the
feasible,
question,
prevent
to
have
chosen
accomplishits purinfringingmeansthe legislaturemight
pose. Consideredin this light, it seemsreasonableto requirethata prima
facie definitionof rapecontaineitherforce or nonconsentas an element,
since attemptingto preventrapeby criminalizingordinaryintercourseis

183. 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding state statute criminalizing consensual sodomy). The
opposition to this case, however, suggests that it may be out of keeping with mainstreamconstitutional
principles.See FARBERET AL., supra note 41, at 548-51 (presentingdifferentobjectionsto decision).
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thanreasonablynecessaryto accomsignificantlymoreliberty-infringing
the
plish only legitimatelegislativepurposein thisarea.18
Mattersbecome slightly more complicatedwhere mala prohibita
crimesareconcerned,butnot insurmountably
so. Theproblemis oftenthat
eitherthe measureadoptedseemstoo remotelyrelatedto the harmfor the
prohibitionto be justified,or the harmmustbe speciouslycharacterized.
Forexample,we wouldprobablybe temptedto identifyeverytrafficregulationas a measuredesignedto increaseautomobileandpedestriansafety.
of the typical
Butis thisreallysufficientto justifythe minuterequirements
motorvehiclecode?Surelya statecouldeliminatea largenumberof these
measureswithouta significantloss in safety.On the otherhand,we can
characterizethe end morenarrowly,so thatthe measurewill beara more
to the state'spurpose.The "norighton red"ruleof
productiverelationship
manycities and some statesmay not be a requiredsafetymeasure,since
manystatesdo withoutit. Andit does imposea significantburdenon drivers in loss of time andincreaseddriverfrustration.
If we characterizethe
end of suchlegislationas minimizingconflictsbetweendriversandpedestriansin denseurbanareas,however,the selectedmeansseemsmoresensibly relatedto the end. In this case, we wouldhave to ask whetherthere
was a significantlyless invasive alternativethe legislaturecould have
adoptedto accomplishthe same purpose.Or considerthe analysisone
might make of legislation dictating which side of the road to drive
on: Whileforbiddingdrivingon the left is liberty-infringing,
it is no more
than
the
other
available
alternative
for
traflibertyinfringing
coordinating
on
the
The
third
fic, namelyforbiddingdriving
alternative,allowing
right.
driversto choosefor themselves,is admittedlyless liberty-infringing,
butit
would not advancethe legitimatelegislativepurposeof minimizingthe
numberof accidents.
ThisParthas soughtto presentthe outlinesof a substantivetheoryof
offense definitionthatis consistentwith the dominantapproachto liberty
in ourconstitutional
tradition.Sucha theoryseemsnecessarybecausethe
prevailingpositivisticapproachto the notionof an offenseis out of keeping with thattradition,and the otherimportantalternativeto positivism,
legal moralism,seemsto strainourintuitionsin manyimportantrespects.
Let us now returnto the two constitutional
doctrineswithwhichwe began,
184. Notice, however, that if we characterize the legislature's purpose more broadly, such as
reducing the amount of intercourse,including unconsented-tointercourse,the purpose is arguablyno
longer legitimate. We can in this way fix an unnecessarily broad selection of means simply by
changing our characterization of the end, and thus assume that the means is not irrationally or
disproportionatelyrelatedto the end. But in this case, we vastly expandthe invasiveness of the end, and
the measure would fail because of the illegitimacy of the state purpose. In general, a legislature's
purpose becomes quickly ratherbizarre when we start expanding the legislative purpose outwardsto
tighten the relation between means and end. And indeed the rational basis test is interpretedmore
plausibly if the end is characterizedmore narrowlyand the real review pertainsto the choice of means.
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in orderto give a rough sense of how a substantivetheory of offense definition would alterthem.
V
TOWARDS A SUBSTANTIVE APPROACH TO BURDEN OF PROOF AND
DOUBLE JEOPARDY

A substantive theory of offense definition would place limits on the
freedom of legislatures to define offenses. The result would be limits on
the ability of the legislaturesto engage in burden-shifting,as well as limits
on their ability to authorize multiple punishmentsfor a single offense. In
the burden-of-proof context, the core elements for each offense would
establish the elements the legislature could not permissibly convert to
affirmative defenses, given that this would remove them from the prima
facie case."85By contrast,a legislature could shift the burdenwith respect
to nonmandatoryelements of an offense, that is, elements that lie outside
the core. One way of understandingthis is to think of the nonmandatory
elements of an offense as extra, that is, nonmandatoryprotectionfor liberty
under the Due Process Clause. If, however, a legislature does choose to
include nonmandatoryelements in its offense definition, Winshipwill apply to those elements. For the presence of an element in an offense definition places citizens on notice that the state will have to make out certain
facts in order to establish a prima facie case of guilt for that offense. By
including elements in an offense definition that exceed the constitutionally
requiredminimum, a state establishes an expectation that individuals will
be free from the reaches of the criminallaw if those elements are not satisfied, and this expectationcreateslibertyrights thatcourtsmay not obviate.
Understandingthe prosecution's burdenof proof in terms of mandatory elements of an offense would make good sense of Winship as a
constitutional guarantee. The decision would stand for the proposition
that the state must bear the burden of proving that minimum set of elements necessary to vindicate the liberty interests of individuals under the
Constitution. We can then understandthe presumptionof innocence as a
constitutionalguaranteewith a significance and a content of its own. That
doctrine would require, for example, that a man be presumedinnocent of
rape until a prosecutor had proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the
185. It at least requires the specification of such a set for any offense to which constitutional
limitations on burdens of proof and related matters apply. As Larry Alexander has explained this
position:
For the substantivists,there are federally defined core elements of each crime that cannot be
eliminated,functionallyas well as formally, or made into defenses, the burdenof which is on
the defendant.A federal law of substantivecrimes, developed underthe Due Process Clause,
or the Eighth Amendment, is the substantivists' Winship-preserving alternative to
Mullaney/Patterson.
Alexander,supra note 39, at 209-10.
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victim was nonconsenting.The legislature could neither draftits rape provision in such a way that excluded this element, nor shift the burdento the
defendantto disprove it, since either scheme would eliminate the element
from the primafacie case.
Defenders of Patterson-type positivism might object that criminalizing intercoursewithout including an element like nonconsent falls outside
the limits of constitutionality to which the Patterson majority referred.
Perhapsthe Patterson majority would have been preparedto regard shifting the burden of proof with respect to nonconsent as a violation of due
process. But if so, the proponentof Patterson-typethinkingmust confront
the following question: What is the difference between shifting the burden
on nonconsent in rape and shifting the burden on extreme emotional disturbance in murder? It is not a sufficient response to say that the Due
Process Clause ensures that states observe only the most minimal procedural safeguards.For the power to review a provision shifting the burden
to a rape defendant to prove consent is presumably no greater than the
power to review a provision shifting the burdenon extreme emotional disturbance. Someone who took this line, then, would need to provide an
argumentfor why a legislatureis obligated to include an element like nonconsent in rape and not obligated to include an element like lack of
extreme emotional disturbancein murder.Furthermore,any such argument
would by necessity be substantive;no formalisticreasoning will explain it.
We might, then, summarizethe difficulty with positivism about the notion
of an offense as follows: If the positivistic approachis incompatiblewith
recognizing limits on the power of legislaturesto define the elements of an
offense, it is inconsistent with other established principles of our constitutional jurisprudence-in particular,principles having to do with the protection of individual liberty. If, on the other hand, it is compatible with
recognizing limits, it must also be compatible with a substantivetheory of
offense definition. Eitherway, there is reason to reject Patterson's positivism aboutthe notion of an offense.
Unfortunately,most problems of offense definition are murkierthan
that of rape and nonconsent. Consider, for example, the relation between
self-defense and homicide. Should we think of the absence of self-defense
as an implicit element of all homicide offenses? Or is the absence of selfdefense a nonmandatoryelement, thus allowing a legislature to shift the
burdento the defendant?The question boils down to whether overcoming
the presumptionagainst the prohibitionon intentional killing depends on
exempting those who act in self-defense from the scope of the prohibition.
And this, in turn,depends on the harmthe prohibitionis meant to address.
Here we have fewer clear intuitionsto guide us than we had in the case of
rape and nonconsent. One feature of this example, however, may help.
Notice that the norms that justify the prohibition on intentional killing
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applyequallyto killingin self-defense.Thatis, therelevantharmis ending
the life of anotherhumanbeing.And thisjustificationremainsapplicable
even if we do not exemptkilling in self-defensefrom the scope of the
norm.Forkillingone's attackerinflictsthisharmon him,evenif it does so
justifiably.Comparethis with the exampleof rape: If we eliminatethe
elementof nonconsentfromthe scopeof the prohibition,the conductprohibitedby the offense definitionitself is not the harmfulconductwhose
withliberty.Herethe elementof nonjustifiesthe interference
prohibition
consentis essentialto identifythe harmthatjustifiesthe decisionto criminalize. Thuswherekilling and self-defenseare concerned,we have two
separatenormsandtwo separateprinciplesof justification:the normthat
on killingandthenormthatpermitskillingin selfjustifiesthe prohibition
defense.The latternormdoes not supplementthe former;it overridesit.
Thatis, the prohibitionon homicidereflectsthe law's commitmentto the
protectionof humanlife andthepreventionof harm.Self-defense,by contrast,reflectsa moralentitlementto repelwrongfulviolenceagainstone's
person.The latterstemsfroma differentaspectof ourmoralandpolitical
philosophythandoes the prohibitionon homicide.Andif this is correct,it
wouldnot be necessaryto includethe absenceof self-defensein a murder
statutein orderto identifytheharmthecrimeof murderprohibits.It would
follow thatthe absenceof self-defenseis not a constitutionallyrequired
or anyotherhomipartof the offensedefinitionfor murder,manslaughter,
cide offense,andthusthatlegislaturescouldpermissiblyplacethe burden
on defendantsto proveit.
We can drawsomegeneralconclusionsfromthe foregoingexamples.
Theneedto justifythe impositionof thecriminalsanctionsuggeststhatwe
shouldtreata defenseprovisionas partof the offenseit qualifieswhenthe
prohibitioncannotmeet the requirementof justificationwithoutit. By
contrast,when the offense provisionis "complete"in the absenceof the
exoneratingcondition,the latterprovisionwill not lie withinthe core of
requiredelementsand so may be treatedas an affirmativedefense.Our
conditionis likely
discussionof rapeandmurdershowsthatanexonerating
and
definition
of
an
offense
to be an implicitpart
requiredfor the latter's
completion,if the principlethatjustifiesthe conditionis the same as that
whichjustifiesthe prohibitionitself. Thatis, wherethe defenseprovision
andthe offensedefinitionarebothjustifiedby the sameprincipleor norm,
the absenceof the defenseprovisionwill probablybe requiredto complete
the normthe offense expresses.By contrast,an exoneratingconditionis
likely to be externalto the offense definitionif the justificationfor the
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conditionis differentfromthatwhichjustifies the rule of prohibition.In
thelattercase,theconditionmaybe treatedas an affirmativedefense.86
Before turningto the problemof doublejeopardy,let us digress
briefly to addressa generalquestionabout the constitutionalcore for
offenses.Is the mensrea requirement
for an offense partof the constitutionallyrequiredoffensedefinition,or shouldonly actusreuselementsbe
includedin the core?To answerthis question,we will firstrequirea distinctionbetweenthe notionof coreelementsanda close cousinof thatidea
the criminallaw alreadycontains,namelythe ideaof a "material"
element.
The ModelPenalCodedefines"materialelementof an offense"as an element that, among other things, is not unconnectedwith "the harmor
evil... soughtto be preventedby the law definingthe offense."'87
While
bothmaterialandcoreelementsare"connected"
withthe harmor evil the
offenseseeksto prohibit,thecoreelementsarethosematerialelementsthat
are requiredfor the offense definitionto meet its burdenof justification.
We should accordinglythink of the test for "core"elements as more
restrictivethanthe testfor "materiality."
A legislaturecouldincludea conin
extraneous
element
its
offensedefinitionthatwouldstill be
stitutionally
Mostproponentsof a substantiveapproachto offensedefini"material."'88
tion urgethe substantivestancepreciselybecausethey wantto be able to
insiston the inclusionof mensreaas a constitutional
Their
requirement.'89
claim is most often that punishingin the absence of a mental state is
unconstitutional
becauseit inflicts the sufferingand stigmaof criminal
convictionon a personwho is not morallyblameworthy.190
Some accordfor all offenses,suchas
inglyproposea minimummentalstaterequirement
or
recklessness.19'
It
seem
negligence
may
strange,then,thatthis Article
has arguedfor a constitutionally
set
required of offenseelementswithout
includingmentalstateelementsin the set. Butthe omissionof mentalstate
elementsis defensibleon a harm-basedtheoryof offense definition,and
indeedit maybe required.First,unlikethe case of legal moralism,a harm
186. For a more detailed discussion of this point, see Claire Finkelstein, Whenthe Rule Swallows
the Exception, in RULESANDREASONS:
ESSAYS
IN HONOR
OFFREDERICK
SCHAUER
(LindaMeyer ed.,
1999).
187. MODEL
PENALCODE? 1.13(10).
188. The comparisonwith the problemof materialitymay help to allay a possible objection to the
idea of a constitutionally requiredcore-that the idea is so vague and indeterminatethat courts will
never be able to develop a consistent set of standardsfor identifying its constituents. But what the
comparisonwith materialityshows is thatjudges presidingover criminalcases are routinelyrequiredto
make determinationsthat are every bit as fuzzy and imprecise. There is no reason to suppose it would
be appreciablymore difficult to specify the core elements of an offense than it currentlyis to specify
which elements of an offense are material.
189. See Packer,supra note 39, at 152.
190. See id.
191. See id. This is ultimatelythe position the Model Penal Code recommended,restrictingthe use
of strict liability to de minimis infractions better thought of as violations than crimes. See MODEL
PENALCODE?? 2.02(1) & 2.05(1)(a).
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theory does not requirethat the offender is morally blameworthyfor punishing him to be justified. The proposals for constitutionalizingmens rea,
by contrast,suggest a commitmentto a moralizedview of the criminallaw.
Second, the characterizationof a harm or evil does not normallyrequirea
specification of the mental state with which that harm is inflicted. The
object of a prohibitionis some type of undesirableconduct, such as killing
or taking the property of another, ratherthan conduct engaged in with a
The mental state is not itself partof what is
mental state of a certainsort.192
This
is
not
to
that
there should be no constitutionalrestricprohibited.
say
tions on the use of strict liability in the criminallaw, butjust that any such
restrictions must be based on constitutional values other than those containedin the due process libertyentitlement.193
If mental state elements are not part of the constitutionally required
core, it follows that a legislaturecould constitutionallyplace the burdenon
a defendantto prove any mens rea-negatingdefense as well.'94The defense
of mistake, for example, can normally be derived from the mental state
element of an offense definition.If the crime of theft is defined as "tak[ing]
or exercis[ing] unlawful control over ... movable propertyof anotherwith
a person who took movable property
purpose to deprive him thereof,"195
underthe mistakenbelief that it was his own would not satisfy the offense
definition, since his mistake would negative the mens rea required for
theft.'96Defenses like mistake are better thought of as an implicit part of
the offense definition than as affirmative defenses when the criminal
offense does contain a mens rea requirement.Thus, if the scienter requirement in theft were constitutionally required,it would be constitutionally
impermissiblefor a legislature to shift the burdenof proof with respect to
the defense of mistake, since that would be tantamount to making the
absence of culpability a defense ratherthan its presence a requirement.If,
however, a scienterrequirementis not partof the core, as suggested, then it

192. See MOORE,
supra note 166, at 3.
193. Recently Alan Michaels has approachedthe constitutionalityof strict liability in a fashion
similar to the one taken here towards other elements of an offense. He argues that there is no uniform
answer to the question of the permissibility of strict liability. Instead, he suggests that the legislature
may impose strict liability with respect to a given element if the conduct the statuteaddressescould be
constitutionally criminalized without that element. See Michaels, supra note 6, at 833. Michaels'
approachto the problem of strict liability shares with the present Article the suggestion that certain
elements of an offense may be constitutionally requiredwhile others may be superfluous. It is with
respect to the latterthat a legislaturemay impose strictliability, accordingto Michaels, and that it may
shift the burdenof proof to the defendant, according to the argumentprovided here. Michaels' article
addresses strict liability only. On the present account, however, not only does the theory of offense
definitionapply to otherkinds of elements, but it ought not apply to mental states at all.
194. This is the case assuming, once again, that mens rea is not constitutionallyrequiredfor other
reasons.
195.

MODELPENALCODE? 223.2(1).

196.

See id. ? 2.04(1)(a).
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would be permissible for the legislature to shift the burdenon the defense
of mistake.
Let us now turn to the ban on multiple punishment for the "same
offense" under the Double Jeopardy Clause. On a substantive theory of
offense definition, the centralquestion of double jeopardy law would have
a nonarbitraryanswer. The question of when two offenses are the "same"
and when differentwould once again be approachedby comparingthe core
elements of each. Suppose, for example, the offense of murdercontained
the required elements of causation and the death of another
human being. Any other elements a legislature might wish to include
would be constitutionally"optional,"such as making the statuteapplicable
to fetuses as well.197Murderand manslaughterwould thus have the same
constitutionally requiredcore, since the same two elements that made up
the core of murderwould make up the core of manslaughteras well. We
should expect this result, given that we have excluded mental state elements from the core, since the essential difference between murder and
manslaughteris mens rea. The result makes sense and tracks currentlaw.
The legislature should not be allowed to punish more than once for murder
and manslaughterwhen these chargesarise from a single killing, since both
prohibitions express the same backgroundnorm. Thus a court can determine whethertwo offenses are the same or differentby asking whetherthe
two offenses have the same or different backgroundjustifications. In the
case of offenses and defenses, we saw that a defense should be thought
"affirmative"when it stems from a differentbackgroundjustification from
the justification that applies to the offense definition. The same logic is at
work here: Two offenses are the same if they stem from a single backgroundjustification and different if they stem from two differentjustifications.
Bringing a substantive approachto offense definition to bear on the
doctrine of double jeopardy preserves the characterof the doctrine as a
constitutionalguarantee.For a state could not obviate the ban on multiple
punishment simply by tacking on a different element to each of two
offenses with a common core. It could not, for example, authorizemultiple
punishmentfor two offenses that are the "same"for double jeopardy purposes by including the term "unlawfully" in a murder prohibition and
including the term "fetus" in the manslaughterprovision. Since neither
element would be part of the mandatorycore, their inclusion would not
serve to make them different offenses for double jeopardy purposes. Nor
could the legislature simply announce its intention to punish the same

197. The term "humanbeing" in a murder statute is usually not taken to include fetuses. See
Keeler v. SuperiorCourt,470 P.2d 617 (1970) (holding murderstatuteinapplicableto killing of fetus).
This applicationof a statutemust thereforebe providedfor explicitly.
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offensetwice, as condonedby Missouriv. Hunter.198
Any statuteauthoriza
such
would
be
scheme
unconstitutional,and courts
ing
punishment
wouldbe underan obligationto interpretambiguousstatutesso as to avoid
thisresultor to strikedownthe statuteif thisprovedimpossible.
How,morespecifically,wouldthe abovestructuresolve the two doctrinalquestionsaboutdoublejeopardywe have considered?Once again,
this Partdoes not purportto offera revisedtheoryof doublejeopardy,but
rathersimplyto indicatehow a substantiveapproachto the notionof an
offensewouldaffectthe constitutional
guarantee.A completetheorymust
awaitthe articulationof specificrestrictionson the notionof an offense
underthe Due ProcessClause.Nevertheless,we can tracethe domainin
whicha revisedtheoryof doublejeopardywouldoperate.First,let us turn
to the questionof cumulativepunishmentfor an offense and one of its
lesser-includedoffenses,andconsiderthe difficultquestionof whetherit
wouldbe permissiblefor a legislatureto authorizecumulativepunishment
for felony murderandfor the predicatefelony used to proveit. If felony
murderis constitutionally
permissible,it mustbe becausethe constitutionally requiredcore for murderdoes not includea mentalstateelement,as
we have supposed.The core set of elementsfor anypredicatefelony,like
differentfromthecoreset
rapeor armedrobbery,will thenbe substantially
murder
and
for
murder.
Both
elements
of
expressindependent
felony
rape
normsof prohibition,andeach offense has its own background
justification.Thetwo arerelatedin thiscase, or so the argumentmightgo, only by
legislative fiat. The legislaturehas chosen to include a nonmandatory
mentalstate requirementin the definitionof murder,and it allows that
elementto be satisfiedby thementalstatefor thepredicatefelony.Butif it
need not, strictlyspeaking,have done so, thenwe areentitledto thinkof
theseas two separateoffensesexpressingtwo quitedifferentnorms.On a
substantiveapproachto offensedefinition,then,it seemsplausibleto allow
foreachoffense.
forcumulativepunishment
By contrast,a substantiveapproachwould probablynot authorize
cumulativepunishmentfor the two offenses involvedin Hunter,namely
armedcriminalactionandits underlyingfelony.Forarguablythe prohibition on possessing a weapondoes not have its own independentbackgroundjustification,as shownby the fact thatweaponspossessionis not
illegalas such.Herea potentiallylegal activityis renderedillegalbecause
anotherfelonyis committedin conjunctionwithit. Thissuggeststhatthere
should
butonlyone.Punishment
arenottwo separatenormsof prohibition,
ratherthancumulatively.
thereforerunconcurrently
While the overwhelmingtendencyof the cases on doublejeopardy
lies in the positivisticdirection,thereis some legal supportfor the substantiveapproach.The support,however,derivesalmostentirelyfromthe
198.

459 U.S. 359 (1983).
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successiveprosecutioncases,wherethe Courthas at timesbeentemptedto
Ex Parte
developdoctrinesthatwouldpreemptlegislativemanipulation.
for example, involved a man who had been living with two
Nielson,199
wives, who was triedfirstfor unlawfulcohabitationandlaterfor adultery.
The second prosecutiondid not technicallyviolate the "elements"test,
since cohabitationrequiredliving togetherbut did not requiresexualrelations,while adulteryrequiredunlawfulsexualrelationsbutdid not require
cohabitation.Nevertheless,the Courtfound that the two offenses were
essentiallythe same,in light of the fact thatbothoffenseswere meantto
prohibitthe sameharmor evil. WhattheNielsonCourtrecognizedis thata
legislatureshouldfashiona singlecrimeto addressa singleharmor evil.20
If the legislaturecriminalizesthe sameharmtwice,albeitin slightlydifferent terms,this shouldnot be sufficientto subjecta defendantto two sentencesfor whatis in essencethe samecrime.Of coursethe legislaturemay
havewantedalternativeformulations
of the sameoffense,sincethebanon
doublejeopardydoes notbara prosecutorfromcharginga defendantwith
bothoffenses,andit neednot even prohibitconvictionfor both,as long as
the state does not punisheach offense separately.Underthese circumstances,the constitutionalguaranteewill requirea state to choose, by
of a
insistingthatit inflict only a single punishmentfor the perpetration
evil.
harm
or
single
Notice,too, thata substantiveapproachto thenotionof an offensehas
the advantageof allowingus to dispensewith the asymmetrybetweenthe
two branchesof doublejeopardylaw, sincethe conceptof an offensewill
for both.Thus,not only shoulda court
providethe necessarydemarcation
comparethe core elementsof two offenses the legislaturehas draftedto
determinewhethersentencesfor themcan runcumulativelyor mustrun
it shouldapplythe sametest to determinewhetherit is perconcurrently,
missibleto bringa secondprosecutionfor an offense arisingout of the
sametransactionas an earlierprosecution.If, for example,the statetriesa
defendantfor manslaughter,whetherhe is acquittedor convictedat the
firsttrial,he cannotsubsequentlybe triedfor murder.The reversewould
also clearlybe true: A convictionor acquittalfor murderwouldbara subsequentprosecutionfor manslaughter.If, however, a defendantshoots
someonein the courseof committinga robbery,he couldfirstbe triedfor
armedrobberyandlaterformurderarisingfromthegunshotwound.
This would solve the GradylDixon
problem,wherethe defendantis
convictedfor a minorinfractionarisingout of a transactionin which he
exposedanotherto a riskof death,andthe victimlaterdies. Althoughthe
Courthas adopteda varietyof techniquesto deal withthis situation,20
the
199.

131U.S. 176(1889).

200.
201.

See id. at 186-88.
See supra text accompanyingnotes 92-96 and sources cited therein.
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resultingdoctrineis convolutedand ad hoc. Withoutenteringinto this
labyrinthineareaof law in detail,the substantiveapproachholds out the
promiseof a simpleandelegantsolution.Thestatemayimposesuccessive
on a personwhohascommittedtwo or moredistinctoffenses,
prosecutions
identifiedaccordingto the substantiveapproachto offensedefinition,and
otherwiseit musttryall chargesin a singleproceeding.Thusthedefendant
in a separateproceedingafterhe
in Gradycouldbe triedfor manslaughter
had pled guilty to drunkdriving,since the core elementsfor the traffic
arenot the same(noris one containedwithin
offenseandfor manslaughter
the other). On the other hand, once the state prosecutessomeone for
attemptedmurder,it cannotbringa secondprosecutionfor murderif the
dies. Whilethis mayseema regrettable
victimof the attemptsubsequently
unfair
to
not
seem
it
does
result,
requiretheprosecutionto choosebetween
a speedy convictionfor attemptedmurderand a more time-consuming
convictionfor murder,all the whileretainingthe possibilityof prosecuting
murderif no deathresultswithintherequiredtime.
attempted
It mightbe arguedthatthis approachis overlyharshby comparison
for it wouldnot at present
withthe currentlaw on successiveprosecutions,
be possiblefor the stateto try a defendantmorethanonce for different
suchas
in manycircumstances,
offensesarisingoutof the sametransaction
whenthe facts neededto provethe offense at the secondtrialformedthe
Thisruleis thoughtnecessary
basisfortheprosecution'scase in thefirst.202
of multipleprosecutionsfor
harassment
the
to protectdefendantsagainst
the sameunderlyingevents.But thereis no reasonto supposethatthe ban
on doublejeopardywas ever meantto be a ruleaboutharassment.
Indeed,
Double
of
the
the
as was pointedout in the debatessurrounding drafting
JeopardyClause,a legislaturemightauthorizemultipleprosecutionsas a
protectionfor thoseaccusedof crimes,ratherthanas an unwantedsource
The standardrefrainaboutharassmentandthe value of
of harassment.203

202. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
203. See Remarksof Mr. Benson discussing proposed draft of constitutionalamendmentin First
ANDORIGINS
SOURCES
DEBATES,
Congress (August 17, 1789), in THEBILLOFRIGHTS:THEDRAFTS,
310 (Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997). This point is easy to see by imagining the following scenario. Suppose
the legislature wants to remedy what it thinks is a problem with excessively proconviction sentiment
amongjuries, and the resulting long sentences and possibly unfairconvictions they seem to engender.
It thereforepasses a measurerequiringa new trial for each year of incarcerationa defendantfaced as a
result of conviction for a given offense. To sentence an offender to 20 years, for example, the
prosecutionwould be requiredto bring 20 differenttrials and impanel 20 differentjuries, one for each
year. Suppose, further,that a defendantcould always waive this extra protection,and elect to have all
20 years adjudicatedin a single trial. It would seem odd to suppose that the ban on double jeopardy
would forbid a legislaturefrom passing such a measure.True, it might be unnecessarilywasteful, and it
would arguablywork a serious unfairnesson the state. But theredoes not seem to be a violation of the
rights of a defendantin allowing such a scheme, since the defendantcould elect the procedurethat he
saw as most advantageous.Thus if we are to preservethe identityof doublejeopardyas a constitutional
guarantee, and also preserve the notion of a constitutional guaranteefor individuals as a right they
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closure in the literatureand opinions on successive prosecution24is reminiscent of the proceduralistinterpretationswe saw in the burden-of-proof
context.25Where there appearsto be no intrinsicjustification for a certain
constitutional guarantee, commentators cast about for some additional
value that is "external"to the constitutionaldoctrine, in an effort to vindicate the doctrineby seeing it as instrumentallyrelated to that value. These
contortions, however, only become attractivewhen needed to breathe life
into a constitutionalguaranteethat has been deprivedof its otherwise natural content. Against the backgroundof a substantivetheory of offense definition, we can take both the presumption of innocence and the ban on
double jeopardy as constitutional values in their own right. There is no
need to cast about for some furtherconstitutionalvalue these doctrinesare
meant to serve.
Let us now consider whethera substantivetheory of offense definition
can shed light on the second problemwe consideredin the doublejeopardy
context, namely the unit-of-prosecutionproblem.This is a fiercely difficult
problem, one that has troubled commentators and practitionersalike for
many years. The suggested framework for a theory of offense definition
will not be able to solve the difficulty, but hopefully a fully articulated
account of the notion of an offense would. For while the legislature will
ordinarily have fairly broad discretion to determine the relevant unit of
prosecution,the requirementof justification would place boundarieson the
units of conduct to which criminaloffenses apply. Permanentlyremoving a
person's property without his consent, for example, is a harm that theft
statutesseek to discourage.But it is not appreciablyworse to steal property
and retain it for fifteen minutes than to retain it for ten. For this reason, a
statutory scheme that treated every ten minute interval as a separate
offense might fail to meet its burden of justification, since it would make
the potential punishment for a single wrongful act of theft arbitraryand
arguablymore invasive of libertythanreasonablynecessary.
This kind of restriction on criminal legislation, however, may seem
pointless. What contributionto liberty does restrictinglegislative decisions
about the unit of prosecution serve? The restriction itself, however, need
not itself promote liberty. It is ratherthat restrictionson the notion of an
offense follow from a right to liberty. Then against the backgroundof a
substantive notion of an offense, it is possible to give noninstrumental
meaning to the ban on double jeopardy. Instead of asking what purpose
that doctrine serves, we take the constitutional provision as sufficient
grounds for the doctrine, and then proceed to interpretthe provision in
possess against their governments, we ought not to think of the avoidance of harassmentas the main
value the ban on successive prosecutionsis designed to protect.
204. See generally Drubel & Westen, supra note 78.
205. See supra text accompanyingnotes 64-73.
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light of the notionof an offense on whichit rests. We need not ask, for
example,aboutthe purposeof the rightto free speechbeforewe conclude
thatsucha rightexists.Thetextualprovisionis sufficientgroundsfor taking therightto be fundamental.
A second answer,however,can also be given that helps to situate
individuation
restrictionsin the traditionof individuallibertyon whichwe
havebeendrawing.On a substantiveapproach,the elementsof an offense
shouldbearsome internalrelationto the underlyingvalue the offense is
meantto protect.If the legislaturewishesto protectits citizensagainstthe
harmwroughtby insecurityin propertyrightsover movableobjects,the
of offensesshouldtrackourordinarydivisionsamongthose
individuation
objects.If, for example,the legislaturewishes to guardagainsttheft of
barnanimals,it oughtto assignone countof theftforeachanimalremoved
fromits owner.This is particularly
importantfor traditionalmalumin se
thatmakesit
natureof theprohibition
crimes.It is arguablytheharm-based
fairto assumecitizensareon noticeof the illegalityof theirconduct.Thus
a statutecriminalizingtheftof a single cow as fifty countsof theft-one
to eachcutof beef thecow couldproduce-couldeasilyfail
corresponding
the notice requirement.Notice is of courseits own doctrine,and thus it
might seem that any concern with notice could be addresseddirectly
requiresno
throughthe Due ProcessClause.Butthatdoctrinetraditionally
publicationfor malain se crimes.Actualnotice,therefore,is not required.
Arguably,the doctrineof presumptivenotice is only acceptablebecause
the crimesto which it appliestracknaturaloffense divisions.And thus
notionof anoffensepointin the samedirection.
noticeandthe substantive
The requirementthatlegislaturesobserve"natural"
divisions,howhere
thereare few
For
crimes.
for
mala
ever, is less stringent
prohibita
intuitionswith whichstatutorypublicitymustcompete.Thusa regulation
way is less damagingif it pertains
dividinga cow up in a counter-intuitive
for beef ratherthantheft.Andthis is why publito a labelingrequirement
cizing a statutemay sometimescure a defect in the individuationof
offensesfor malaprohibitacrimes,butwhy suchdefectsareharderto cure
forcrimesthataremalain se.
Finally, even if notice were not problematic,allocatinga separate
punishmentfor each cut of beef wouldprobablyleave the punishmentfor
stealingan entirecow unjustified,given the significantdeprivationof libertyit wouldinvolve.For not only woulda defendantbe subjectto sepabuthe couldbe tried
ratebutcumulativepenaltiesfor a singletransaction,
The
harm.
the
same
is
what
for
times
powera legislature
essentially
fifty
wouldbe extenminor
offense
otherwise
for
to
couldgive prosecutors any
constraintsoutside
sive. And given the generalabsenceof proportionality
the death penalty area, the punishmentfor some conductcould easily
becomeextremelyharsh.Indeed,the problemwouldnot even be entirely
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alleviatedby resuscitatingthe jurisprudenceof proportionality.
For that
doctrinewouldplace an upperboundon permissiblepunishmentfor each
instanceof a givenoffense.It wouldnotlimitthetotalnumberof instances
of an offense for which a defendantcould be prosecutedarisingout of a
In this sense,the doctrineof doublejeopardy,on a subsingletransaction.
stantive interpretation,seems a necessary concomitantof the Eighth
Amendment
banon cruelandunusualpunishment.
This Parthas offeredonly the most generalindicationof how a substantivetheoryof offensedefinitionwouldrevisethe presumption
of innocence andthe ban on doublejeopardy.It has triedto show thata simple
andnaturalinterpretation
of eachdoctrinewouldemergeif combinedwith
a substantivetheory of offense definition.While currentcriminallaw
is committedto seeingthe notionof an offenseas a legislajurisprudence
tive concept,to importthis perspectiveinto constitutionalprovisionsthat
dependon the notionof an offense is both distortingand anachronistic.
The view of criminaloffensesas creaturesof legislativefiat is a relatively
recentone. A constitutionthatbuiltits criminalguaranteesarounda view
of crimeas createdlaw wouldprobablyhavebeen structured
quitedifferentlyfromourcurrentBill of Rights.
VI
CONCLUSION

Thepositivistunderstanding
of the notionof an offenseappearsto be
the terrafirmaon whichthe variousdebatesaboutconstitutional
criminal
law take place. This is a curiousfeatureof contemporarycriminallaw
for suchan approachseemsneitherrequiredby ourcriminal
jurisprudence,
law conceptsnor internallyconsistentwith our constitutionaltradition.
Indeed,as thisArticlehas argued,it standsin someconflictwiththe aspect
of that traditionthat has to do with individualliberty,on at least one
of thatnotion.It shouldalso be
prevalentand compellingunderstanding
stressedthatthe positiviststanceis not a necessaryconcomitantof a nonmoralizedview of the notionof an offense.It is an unfortunate
featureof
the moder conceptionof law thatthe alternativeto law as the arbitrary
exerciseof sovereigntyis the highlymoralizedlegacyof naturallaw theories. One of the advantagesof securingrights througha constitutional
structureis that"created"
law canbe limitedby andinterpreted
in lightof
the moregeneralprinciplesof ourpoliticalphilosophythatconstitutional
structureexpresses.In this sense, our most basic constitutionalconcepts
areneitherwholly"created"
on the one handnorentirely"discovered"
on
theother.
The alternativeto positivism about the notion of an offense this
Articlehas exploredtreatsthe notionof an offenseas theproductof a theory of justifiableinterferencewith liberty.That theory is based on an
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argumentabout the role of harm in justifying infringementsof liberty. A
numberof importantquestions, however, remainunanswered,and whether
a substantive theory of offense definition is ultimately defensible will
depend on the plausibility of the answers we give them. First, this Article
has not sought to provide a complete theory of punishment. What the
harm-basedtheory of justified liberty-infringementsuggests is only that
criminalprohibitionstrackharmthatjustifies the particularinfringementof
liberty the statute authorizes. A harm-basedtheory of punishment would
requireextensive furtherargumentto be convincing, and in particularto be
convincing as an articulationof a constitutionaltheory of justified libertyinfringement.
Second, this Article has not attemptedto provide any account of harm
itself. What exactly is a harm and what kinds of harms are of sufficient
gravity to justify infringing the liberty of citizens? A more precise specification of the proper objects of criminal prohibitions would ultimately
require a more thorough account of the notion of harm. The absence of a
theory of harm, however, is not a lacuna of a theory of offense definition.
For the concept of harm need not itself be constitutionallyspecified. And
unlike liberty and property, the notion of harm need not be legislatively
defined if it is not constitutionallysupplied. There are certainconcepts the
law must borrow from ordinarypractices. But a theory of harm is nonetheless necessary if legislaturesandjudges are to apply a harmprincipleto
judge actual legislation, and thus the notion of harmwill have to be a welldefined one.
Finally, the notion of liberty requires much greater exploration. For
the limits on the notion of an offense will be the mirrorimage of the shape
of the right to liberty citizens possess. If, as many appearto think, there is
no general backgroundprotectionfor liberty per se, limits on offense definition will remain ad hoc and difficult to justify. Alternatively,they might
disappearaltogether.

